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Citizenship Narratives in the Absence of Good Governance:
Voices of the Working Poor in Bangladesh
Naila Kabeer with Ariful Haq Kabir
Summary
The complex nature of the challenge posed by state–society relations to the 
realisation of citizenship rights in the poorer countries of the world reflects the
incapacity or unwillingness on the part of the state to guarantee basic security of
life and livelihoods to its citizens and its proneness to capture by powerful elites
that perpetuate this state of affairs. Consequently, access to resources continue to
be defined by position within an unequal social order that is largely constituted by
the ascribed relationships of family, kinship, caste and so on. These relationships
pervade all spheres of society, rendering irrelevant the idea of an impersonal 
public sphere which individuals enter as bearers of rights, equal in the eyes of the
law. Indeed, given their reliance on patron client relations for their basic survival
and security, the idea of individual rights is unlikely to have much meaning or 
relevance in the lives of most poor people. 
This paper explores the hypothesis that the possibility of belonging to alternative
associations whose membership is not ‘given’ by position in the social order holds
out the greatest promise for democratising the social order. Bangladesh offers an
interesting context in which to explore this hypothesis because while it embodies
most the problems of bad governance outlined above, it also has a large number
of civil society organisations, many of whom work primarily with the poorer 
sections of society. The research focused on the working poor who are most likely
to belong to these associations. Analysis of their narratives about their lives and
livelihood and their views about rights and social justice suggests, not surprisingly,
that there is nothing inherently democratic about civil society organisations in
Bangladesh, even those ostensibly oriented to the interests of poor people. What
appeared to explain the extent to which organisations were able to achieve 
democratic outcomes appeared to depend, first of all, on the extent of their 
commitment to the promotion of citizenship rights among poor people and 
secondly, on the extent to which they were able to carry out their commitments
without interference from the state. In the context of Bangladesh, the state
appeared to be far more pro-poor in rural than in urban areas.
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1 Introduction
1.1 Citizenship, collective action and the ‘capacity to aspire’
The complex nature of the challenge posed by state–society relations to the 
realisation of citizenship rights in the poorer countries of the world constitutes a
distinct strand of analysis in the literature on citizenship (see review in Kabeer
2002). It points out that the constitutions of these countries recognise the formal
rights of citizenship, but their limited success with industrialisation, the uneven
spread of market relations, the continued gulf between urban and rural life, the
incapacity or unwillingness on the part of the state to guarantee basic security of
life and livelihoods to its citizens and its proneness to capture by powerful elites
have meant that democracy has very shallow roots in many of these contexts.
Identity, affiliations and access to resources are defined by one’s place within a
social order that is largely constituted by the ascribed relationships of family, 
kinship, caste and so on, ‘the communities of birth’. These relationships pervade
all spheres of society and render irrelevant the idea of an impersonal public
sphere which individuals enter as bearers of rights, equal in the eyes of the law.
Indeed, given the persistence of deeply entrenched social inequalities, 
‘individuality as a way of social being is extremely precarious’ (Khilnani 1997: 26).
I would argue that the problem of citizenship in these societies is not so much the
absence of individualism in the ontological sense, the claim that a society is made
up of atomised individuals and is no more than the sum of these individuals, as it
is the absence of ethical individualism, the idea of the equal moral worth of all
individuals and hence their equality in relation to certain basic rights and 
responsibilities. As Robeyns (2005) points out, a commitment to the equal rights
of individuals is perfectly compatible with an ontological worldview that recognises
the connections between people and the socially embedded nature of their values
and experiences. The challenge that such societies face therefore is not greater
individualism per se but the democratisation of state–society relations to allow
recognition of the basic rights of all individuals, regardless of their place in society.
The democratisation of the state and the democratisation of society must clearly
go hand in hand. The problem is that the capacity to bring about these changes is
generally weakest among those who have the greatest stake in achieving them:
people who are poor, vulnerable and socially excluded. Living close to the 
margins of survival, uncertain of their ability to meet their basic daily needs, these
groups are often forced to bind themselves into highly asymmetrical patron–client
relationships through which they secure the resources they need for their 
subsistence in return for labour and loyalty to their patrons (Smith 1997; Wood
2003). Fear of the loss of such patronage, and the modicum of security it offers,
has profound implications on the capacity of subordinate groups to express voice
on their own behalf and to exercise political agency in pursuit of their rights. 
Material dependency is thus one way in which systems of domination reproduce
themselves over time. In addition, they reproduce themselves through hegemonic
ideologies which explain and justify their existence, securing compliance on the
part of subordinate groups to their place in the social order. As Scott (1990) points
IDS WORKING PAPER 331
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out, this may be a merely ‘surface compliance’ which conceals hidden dissent
waiting for the opportunity to express itself. Or it may be ‘real compliance’ based
on the internationalisation of inferiority and the hopelessness of change.
Hegemonic power of this ‘thicker’ kind does not merely deny subordinate groups
the capacity to exercise voice and agency on their own behalf, it also closes off
their capacity to imagine an alternative way of life, the ‘capacity to aspire’
(Appudarai 2004). Future life chances are largely determined by identity at birth,
transforming ‘communities of birth’ into ‘communities of fate’. 
To become a citizen in such contexts is to transcend the constraints of birth and
ascribed status, to acquire the capacity to question, to challenge and to aspire –
as well as the capacity to make changes that reflect these aspirations. As Lister
(1997) puts it, ‘to act as a citizen requires: first a sense of agency, the belief that
one can act; acting as a citizen, especially collectively, in turn fosters that sense of
agency. Thus agency is not simply about the capacity to choose and act but also
about a conscious capacity which is important to the individual’s self-identity’. This
is a notion of citizenship that fuses consciousness, capacity and collective action.
While all three elements are critical, the emphasis on the collective has a 
particular resonance for the contexts we are interested in. 
While the idea of citizenship is premised on the principle of ethical individualism,
viz. the equal worth of all individuals irrespective of their circumstances at birth
and their station in life, it draws its legitimacy from the collective participation of all
citizens in drawing up the shared framework of principles and values that define
their vision of society. If we cannot take for granted the willingness or capacity on
the part of members of subordinate groups to exercise independent forms of
agency in pursuit of their own individual goals, we certainly cannot take for 
granted their willingness or capacity to contest hegemonic beliefs and values and
construct alternative visions of society. The capacity to think and act as part of a
larger collective is thus an essential part of the processes by which subordinate
groups are empowered to act – as individuals and as citizens. It is critical to the
processes of personal transformation through which subordinate groups move
from accepting their place in the social order as fate, misfortune or divine to 
‘naming’ it as the product of unjust social arrangements. And it is critical to the
social processes through which they gain the sense of solidarity and strength of
purpose necessary to engage in the struggle for their rights. As history has shown,
it is not political protest by single individuals but the ‘collective struggles of the 
dispossessed’ that have won the ‘rights of citizenship’ (Bowles and Gintis 1987: x,
cited in Foweraker and Landman 2000: 1). 
This view of the importance of the collective dimensions of personal trans-
formation clearly resonates with an ontological perspective in which one’s sense
of identity and self does not exist prior to, or outside of, social relationships but is
constituted inter-subjectively: ‘… it is the kinds of associations which we inhabit
that define the kind of individuals we will become’ (Benhabib 1992: 71). It is
through their associations with others that individuals learn to speak, think and
act; to understand themselves and their place in the world. This perspective
implies that one’s sense of self and identity is not predetermined or fixed but open
and subject to challenge and change. In particular, it suggests that subjectivities
can be transformed through participation in forms of associational life which 
09 
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provide a reflexive distance from what has hitherto appeared a ‘given’ or pre-
ordained place in the social order and which therefore open up the possibility for
questioning, criticizing and challenging the justice of this order (Benhabib 1992).
The general identification of civil society with the sphere of voluntary associations,
or ‘communities of choice’, explains its importance in the theoretical literature on
democratic practice (see review in Elliot 2006; Foweraker and Landman 1997;
Betteille 2000). However, not all civil society associations necessarily promote the
kinds of critical transformations we are interested in: there are many associations
that serve, and indeed exist, to reinforce inequality and exclusion. Associations
are more likely to promote critical consciousness and democratic practice when
they are inclusive rather than exclusionary in their membership; when they draw
on horizontal solidarities rather than vertical loyalties; when they embody 
democratic rather than autocratic principles in their own operations; and when
they seek to challenge the arbitrary exercise of power rather than to bolster the
status quo.
Such associations need not necessarily operate in formal political spaces. Indeed,
in the absence of a democratic state, formal political processes become merely
another route through which inequalities of power are reproduced. Instead, 
struggles to democratise those relations of everyday life that impinge most directly
on the livelihood struggles of marginalised groups may provide a more effective
route into the larger collective struggle to democratise state and society. As Gould
(1996) suggests, we need to extend our understanding of politics to encompass
collective struggles to deal with power relations in the different spheres of life in
which people come together to engage in shared practical activities. Such 
struggles have democratic relevance in that they help to train people in the 
practice of democracy. 
1.2. Objectives of the paper: exploring citizenship and collective
action in the Bangladesh context
The aim of this paper is to explore some of these theoretical ideas about 
citizenship, collective action and the ‘capacity to aspire’ in the specific context of
Bangladesh. It is interested in the meanings and expressions of citizenship among
the working poor in one of the poorer countries of the world. It is also interested in
the extent to which participation in ‘chosen’ forms of associational life makes a 
difference in these meanings and expressions; the extent to which it promotes the
capacity to aspire to an alternative vision of society among those who have little
reason to be satisfied with the current arrangements. 
Bangladesh provides an interesting context in which to explore these ideas for a
number of reasons. First of all, it appears to exemplify many of the barriers to 
citizenship discussed in the previous section. The country has been under military
rule of one kind or another for much of its history, first as part of Pakistan
(1947–1971) and since then, as the independent nation of Bangladesh, between
1976 and 1991. Democracy was restored in 1991 and a number of elections held
at both national and local levels until military rule in civilian disguise was 
re-imposed in 2007. Elections are now due to be held at the end of 2008.
IDS WORKING PAPER 331
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However, it is not simply the presence or absence of formal multi-party democracy
that constitutes the problem of citizenship in Bangladesh but the pervasiveness of
‘bad governance’ in all aspects of life. 
Bangladesh has had the dubious honour of being declared most corrupt country in
the world by Transparency International for five years consecutively (1997–2001).
Of recent attempts to explain the problem of governance in Bangladesh, the most
pessimistic perhaps is to be found in Wood (2000). He traces it to the ‘deep 
structures’ of the society which effectively ‘imprison’ its inhabitants within 
relationships of dependence from which there are few avenues of escape. As
Wood points out, the state in Bangladesh has never been equally accessible to all
citizens, either in the days when the country was part of Pakistan or since it
gained its independence in 1971. Its resources have been allocated through 
pervasive patron client networks which stretch down to the village level, allowing
the family and kinship groups that dominate these networks, both locally and
nationally, to monopolise public sector distribution. The ‘moral logic’ of kinship at
stake in these relationships requires that the priorities of family, kin and close
social networks take precedence over the large public good. Forms of behaviour
that may appear opportunistic, manipulative, corrupt or nepotistic by Weberian
standards of bureaucratic practice are considered legitimate if they serve these
priorities. Not only does this disadvantage those sections of the population who do
not have access to influential social networks (often members of religious and 
ethnic minorities), or occupy an inferior status within them (women and poorer 
relatives), it also undermines the likelihood that public institutions will produce
equitable and predictable outcomes on the basis of transparent and impersonal
criteria. This is the realm of personal favours and discretionary outcomes. 
Wood uses the metaphor of the prison to convey the idea of Bangladesh society
as a ‘total institution’ which prescribes all aspects of its inmates’ lives. Survival
within the system dictates that social actors have little choice but to follow the 
dysfunctional forms of behaviour generated by these systemic institutional forces.
He suggests that this has given rise to inequalities that are so deep-rooted in the
‘psychology of Bengali society’ that they translate into ‘natural’ deference-authority
dyads making it impossible for the inmates of this prison to either reform its 
institutions or free themselves through their own efforts. Those who seek escape
must therefore look for assistance to those outside the system: ‘donor and other
external well-wishers have a duty to provide that assistance’ (p. 237).
While there is widespread consensus within Bangladesh that the problem of bad
governance are indeed deep-seated, not all the ‘inmates’ subscribe to Wood’s
explanation of the problem nor to the benign role ascribed to ‘donors and other
external well-wishers’. Sobhan (2000), for instance, suggests that donors are as
culpable for the current state of affairs in Bangladesh as the privileged national
elites who benefit from it. They have shown little concern with problems of 
democracy, good governance or human rights for much of the history of their
involvement with developing countries: ‘even poverty alleviation was seen as the
inevitable by-product of economic growth’. Few questions were raised about the
legitimacy of the succession of military leaders that have ruled Bangladesh, both
prior to, and after, its independence. When they did turn their attention to 
questions of governance in the late 1970s, it was confined to public sector reforms
along neoliberal lines, correcting for excessive state intervention in the economy
and opening it up to global competition. It was only with the demise of the Cold
War and the ‘depreciation in the value of Third World regimes as strategic assets’
(p. 78), that donors began to take particular regimes to task for the abuse of
human rights and malfeasance in the use of aid. 
Nor does Sobhan appear to regard problems of bad governance in Bangladesh as
inherent in the country’s institutions. He sees it rather as the hardening of what
was an ‘essentially regulatory problem at the beginning of the 1980s’ into systemic
malfunctioning because it was left unattended. And while he notes that social
stratification – and economic inequality – has grown in recent years, he suggests
that it is not as deeply embedded within the structures of society in the way that
feudal relationships and caste inequalities are embedded in the social structures
in India, Pakistan or Nepal: ‘Bangladesh society remains more fluid with 
considerable scope for upward mobility. Few if any people in Bangladesh can
claim to power through an inherited social legitimacy … Bangladesh’s prevailing
social hierarchies remain exposed to challenge from below as well as from 
competing aspirants because the legitimacy of these differences is not widely
accepted’ (p. 82).
The idea of the ‘challenge from below’ takes us to the second reason that makes
Bangladesh a particularly interesting context in which to explore the democratic
potential of collective action outlined earlier. The static and unchanging picture
conveyed by Wood’s metaphor of a prison is partly belied by what can be termed
the Bangladesh paradox: remarkable social progress in recent decades in a 
context of persistent and pervasive governance failure. As a World Bank report
puts it, compared with the calamitous conditions that prevailed in the aftermath of
its devastating war of independence in 1971, it has come a long way, ‘defying the
prophets of doom and faring better than most had hoped’ (2003: i). It has had 
rising levels of economic growth, and, since the 1990s, a slow but steady decline
in poverty. It has also increased life expectancy, reduced infant mortality, 
dramatically lowered its fertility rates, spread immunisation, promoted women’s
labour force participation through microfinance and export manufacturing and
closed the gender gap in education with overall increases in primary and 
secondary education. 
These changes provide some support for the fluidity of social relationships in
Bangladesh remarked on by Sobhan. Credited with an important role in bringing
about these changes (World Bank 2003 and 2006) and of particular pertinence for
the concerns of this paper, are the country’s civil society organisations. It is 
estimated that there are around 22,000 of these organisations registered with 
various divisions of the government (eg. Social Welfare, Women, Youth and the
NGO Bureau). Most are voluntary organisations of various kinds and include trade
unions and labour organisations, welfare associations, religious groups, legal
advocacy groups, human rights activists and various feminist, women’s rights
organisations and development NGOs. While the vast majority of civil society
organisations are small and highly localised, drawing on voluntary efforts to
engage in cultural, professional or philanthropic activities, development NGOs
today are among some of the largest in the world and dominate the civil society
landscape in Bangladesh. 
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These organisations have undergone a number of changes since they came into
existence in the aftermath of the war of liberation in 1971 and the famine that 
followed shortly after. While the need to provide relief and rehabilitation to a 
devastated population provided the initial impulse, they subsequently evolved into
development organisations. A large number of them operated with a structural
analysis of poverty as the product of unequal power relations and were committed
to mobilising poor people to fight for their basic entitlements. They were largely
funded on a solidarity basis by international NGOs, private foundations and a few
progressive donors (eg. OXFAM, War on Want, CUSO, Swallows, NORAD, Ford
Foundation). 
After a short-lived period of democracy, the country came under extended military
rule in 1976. The resulting contraction of political space led a number of NGOs to
move away from their earlier radical analysis towards a service delivery role, with
an emphasis on group-based microfinance services led by the Grameen Bank.
These changes accelerated in the 1990s when the official donor community
began to provide large-scale funding to NGOs as a preferred ‘private’ sector 
alternative to the state in the delivery of social services to low income households.
The NGO share of total aid disbursed to Bangladesh rose from 6 per cent in 1990
to 17 per cent five years later where it remained for the rest of the decade. The
effects of this were considerable (Devine 2003). 
First of all, it led to a rapid expansion in the NGO sector: the number of 
indigenous NGOs grew from 395 in 1990 to 1223 in 2000. They now dominate the
civil society landscape in Bangladesh, particularly in rural areas. Secondly, donor
concerns with transaction costs and the need to disburse large amounts of money
led to the concentration of funding on the largest NGOs, moving them into ‘in a
league of their own’ (Devine 2003). Of the approximately 1,250 indigenous and
international NGOs that received donor funds in 1999–2000,1 the 11 largest
received 85 per cent of all donor assistance to NGOs while the three largest
(ASA, BRAC and Proshika) received 72 per cent of this assistance. 
Secondly, the growing preoccupation on the part of donors with financial 
sustainability led to a remarkable homogenisation across the NGO sector: the 
provision of microfinance became the dominant model. A survey of 300 
development NGOs in 2004 found that 92 per cent of them offered some form of
microcredit (World Bank 2006). Around half confined themselves to financial 
services alone, but others combined it with service provision in health, water and
sanitation and education. Many included awareness-raising on issues such as
health, sanitation and nutrition and a few also engaged in lobbying or advocacy
with the state. Only a very small minority of NGOs continue to give priority to
social mobilisation of the poor. This shift in NGO activity is reflected in the 
expenditure patterns of the 11 largest NGOs: social services and social 
mobilisation activities made up around 43 per cent of their combined expenditures
in 1989 and had fallen to 28 per cent in 1998. Within this category, social 
mobilisation activities declined from 11 per cent to 6 per cent (Devine 2003). 
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1 2004 estimates suggest 2000 development NGOs operate in the country of whom around 1200 of 
them rely on external funding sources (World Bank 2006). 
As a result, Bangladesh has a somewhat bifurcated civil society. While the 
majority of trade unions, feminist organisations, professional associations, human
rights groups, student platforms and cultural groups operate in urban areas, 
development NGOs, with a few exceptions, are focused on the rural poor. They
are estimated to operate in more than 78 per cent of rural villages in Bangladesh
(World Bank 1996) and to reach around 35 per cent of the entire population
(Thornton et al. 2000). The findings of the present study, which was designed to
analyse the implications of ‘chosen’ forms of associational life for the identity and
practices of their membership, reflects the bifurcated character of civil society in
Bangladesh. 
1.3 Methodological approach: narratives about citizenship, rights
and social justice
The aim of the study was to use the narratives of poor people in rural and urban
areas in Bangladesh to explore how they understood the inter-related concepts of
citizenship, rights and social justice and their capacity to aspire to alternative
visions of society. There has been very little research on these questions in the
context of Bangladesh and semi-structured, in-depth discussions appeared to be
an appropriate way into everyday understandings of these concepts. The main
focus of the study is on sections of the working poor who were most likely to be
affiliated to ‘chosen’ forms of association. The decision to use economic criteria to
select the study sample reflected our belief that in a poor country like Bangladesh,
where there are no guaranteed safety nets, the struggle to earn a livelihood 
occupies a central place in the daily experiences of the poor. It is therefore in the
context of their livelihood struggles that we are likely to find the main possibilities
for poor people’s participation in associational life beyond the given circles of 
family and kinship. 
It was evident to us from the outset that livelihood struggles and associated 
possibilities for poor people to participate in chosen forms of association varied
considerably between urban and rural locations. The urban population has been
growing steadily largely as the result of waves of rural to urban migration by men,
women and children, due to loss of land through river erosion, fraud, debt and so
on and to the overall dearth of employment opportunities in the countryside. Most
of them set up their homes in slum neighbourhoods in urban areas. It is estimated
that around 35 per cent of Dhaka’s population live in slum neighbourhoods (Banks
2006). Although rates of poverty reduction have been faster in urban areas than in
rural, the urban poor face other kinds of disadvantage. Most do not own 
residential land and must rent accommodation from private landlords or occupy
public land illegally. Most do not have legal access to public utilities, such as 
electricity and gas, and rely on illegal connections provided by slum leaders at
exorbitant prices. Successive governments have concentrated their poverty 
reduction efforts in rural areas at the expense of urban in order to discourage 
further migration. As a result, the urban poor have poorer access to basic services
leading to lower enrolment rates, higher rates of drop outs and more severe rates
of malnutrition. 
Several slum communities have been evicted by the government in recent years
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and have either failed to be rehabilitated, as stipulated by the law, or been 
rehabilitated to peripheral areas of the city where they are cut off form their 
livelihoods. 
The most prominent associations of the working poor in urban areas were trade
unions and development NGOs. Trade unions are largely concentrated among
workers in formal employment while development NGOs, mainly offering micro-
finance, focus their activities on the self-employed. Consequently, we decided to
draw our respondents in urban areas from the following categories: 
l Male retrenched workers from Adamjee jute mills who had trade union 
connections. 
l Male and female wage workers from the export garment industry who had 
connections with trade unions, development NGOs and legal rights 
organisations. 
l Male and female self-employed workers in the urban informal economy, the 
group most likely to have links with development NGOs.
The jute mills and garment factories are, in principle, covered by the country’s
labour laws, including the right to organise and engage in collective bargaining.
We therefore expected to find trade unions to be the most important associations
in the lives of these workers. In practice, trade union membership was high
among the male jute mill workers and extremely uneven among the largely female
garment workers. Given the absence of trade unions in the informal economy, we
selected our informal workers on the basis of their association with development
NGOs. The main associations in the lives of the urban self-employed were the
minimalist microfinance organisations (MFOS), including Association for Social
Advancement (ASA) and Shakti, Manobik Shahajjo Shangsht, (MSS), World
Vision. However, they also included a number who had interacted with the few
socially-oriented NGOs active in the urban slums.
Our rural sample was purposively drawn from the membership of three socially-
oriented NGOs: BRAC, Nijera Kori and Samata. BRAC has been active since
1972 but has gone through a number of incarnations. Its initial strategy was to
combine social mobilisation and community development. It then moved into the
delivery of group-based microfinance to poor women, using the model pioneered
by Grameen Bank, combining it with education , environmental awareness, social
forestry and health related services, weakened the focus on social mobilisation in
the 1980s, partly in response to the backlash from successive military 
governments and partly to the drive for financial sustainability demanded by the
donor community, but re-established a focus on social development in the late
1990s. Microfinance remains the core of BRAC’s activities. It is present in all the
districts of Bangladesh and, as of 2007, had over 6 million members in its Rural
Development Programme, all of them women. 
Nijera Kori (NK) and Samata are smaller and more geographically concentrated.
NK was begun in 1980 by a group of activists who had split from BRAC when it
abandoned its focus on social mobilisation and had taken over what had been a
defunct welfare organisation for destitute women. Samata was set up as a youth
club for young men in a particular village in northern Bangladesh but, through
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interactions with Oxfam, evolved into a social mobilisation organisation in the 
mid-seventies. The two organisations have a great deal in common, eschewing
delivery of service and focusing on organising groups of landless women and men
to claim their rights. Both had over 200,000 members in 2007, around 60 per cent
of them women. NK is active in around 17 districts of the country while Samata is
more geographically concentrated around 7 districts. 
There are therefore very different kinds of ‘chosen’ associations represented in
our sample. The older trade unions are membership-based organisations with
members paying fees towards the organisational expenses. The newer unions,
mainly active in the garment industry, also stress membership fees but have been
less successful in building membership-based organisations. They are prevented
from operating within factories and seek to recruit members through the advice
and support they provide to workers in conflict with employers. Relationships with
microfinance organisations are generally group-based, with members of groups
guaranteeing each others’ loans. There is frequently no relationship between
group members other than the financial one. Organisations like BRAC and
Proshika are different from the more minimalist microfinance organisations
because they seek to combine provision of microfinance with a range of other
services, including education and legal training, while Proshika has retained a
focus on social mobilisation. Nijera Kori and Samata seek to build membership-
based organisations. Their groups operate independently of the NGOs and have
their own democratically elected structures. The forms of associational life we will
be describing therefore vary from thin affiliations to active membership. 
Table 1.1 Breakdown of respondents by gender, economic category
and residential location
72 women and men were chosen from these predetermined economic categories
on the basis of informal contacts and ‘cold-calling’ in different rural and urban
locations (Table 1.1). The interviews used a loose life history framework to explore
the lives and livelihoods of the workers and the significance of different kinds of
relationships to their wellbeing and agency. It also sought information on how
these workers understood concepts such as rights, citizenship and justice and
what their understanding reflected about their lives. 
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Urban categories Female Male
Jute mill workers 0 5
Garment factory workers 8 3
Microfinance clients 15 0
Rural categories
BRAC 5 0
Nijera Kori 9 10
Samata 7 10
Total 44 28
The main hypothesis that this paper set out to explore was the extent to which
chosen forms of associations open to different sections of the working poor
shaped their capacity to think and act like citizens. We expected this capacity to
vary by location because of obvious rural urban differences in these associational
possibilities. However, it became evident that differences in associational poss-
ibilities in turn reflected underlying differences in economic opportunities, 
structures of power and the role of the state in the two contexts. Our study 
therefore helps to uncover some of the deeper structural barriers to citizenship
and collective action in rural and urban areas in Bangladesh. Since sample 
selection was purposive rather than random, the study cannot make statistically
representative generalisations about the implications of associational life for the
identity and practice of citizenship. However, as one of the first attempts to
explore grassroots narratives about citizenship and collective action in the context
of Bangladesh, it can provide preliminary analytical insights into these issues and
provide the basis for a more systematic research design at a later stage. 
The rest of the paper has the following structure. Section 2 discusses the 
narratives of working poor men and women in urban areas while Section 3 does
the same for our rural sample. They highlight the difference in the underlying 
contexts for the kinds of livelihoods they pursued, the terms on which they
engaged with the state and their capacity for collective action. Section 4 explores
how these differences might also influence their views of the just society and
hence their ‘capacity to aspire’. Finally Section 5 draws together the different
threads of the narrative in order to address the main propositions that the
research set out to explore. 
2 ‘On not being a citizen’: 
associational life and collective 
action in the urban context
2.1 Jute mills workers and the ‘old’ trade unions
The Bangladesh jute industry was, till the 1980s, the country’s largest industry
and its primary foreign exchange earner. It was dominated by the Adamjee jute
mills which were set up in the early 1950s by a wealthy industrial family and
nationalised in the early seventies after Bangladesh’s independence. Regarded as
the largest jute mills in the world, its overwhelmingly male workforce numbered
many thousands. They were housed in their own township outside Dhaka,
Adamjee Nagar, which was built around the mills and contained all the facilities
needed by the workers, including schools for their children. As part of the formal
economy, they were covered by the labour laws and social security benefits. The
five main trade unions in the country were all registered in the industry (along with
some unregistered ones) and it was widely regarded as a hotbed of trade 
unionism (BBC News, 30 June 2002).
As in other parts of South Asia, the main unions were all affiliated to political 
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parties and union activities were largely driven by partisan politics. Moreover, as in
the rest of South Asia, trade unions confined their activities to workers in the 
formal economy, in large-scale public and private enterprises. This meant that,
within the jute mills, they focused their attention on the permanent section of the
workforce, ignoring the large pool of casual or badli workers who were given
employment on a daily basis. Although by law, casual workers should have been
given permanent appointments within two month of joining, the speed with which
a badli worker actually attained this coveted position depended on his connections
within the union hierarchy. Some obtained permanent contracts shortly after 
joining, others after 15 or 20 years and the payment of hefty bribes. Consequently,
the protections and privileges associated with formal employment were very
unevenly distributed among the Adamjee workforce. Nevertheless, casual workers
lived in the constant hope of transition to permanent status at some stage in their
working lives. 
The steady decline in international demand for jute and the huge losses incurred
by the industry since its nationalisation finally led to the closure of the mills in
2002 amidst vociferous allegations of management incompetence, trade union
irresponsibility and pervasive corruption. Although closure had been on the cards
for a number of years, when it finally happened, it was done swiftly with no protest
from the union leaders. Not only did the closure lead to the redundancy of 25,000
permanent workers and 5000 temporary workers, but, as one of our respondents
pointed out, it also led to loss of employment for a further 25,000 or so others who
provided goods and services to the jute mill workers. A bustling community was
turned overnight into a ghost town and workers who thought that they had a 
guaranteed job for life found themselves among the ranks of the newly poor, their
meagre redundancy payments rapidly used up as they searched for alternative
work. 
We interviewed a number of these workers very soon after the closure of the
mills. It was evident from the interviews that trade unions had featured actively in
the lives of the mill workers, directly in the case of the permanent workforce and
indirectly for the rest. It was also clear that they had done little to promote 
awareness of labour laws or to fight for the rights of their membership. Instead,
our respondents were unanimous in their belief that blame for the closure of the
mills should be shared equally between the management, the trade union 
leadership and those ‘self-interested individuals in the political parties’ who had
backed the unions. The system that these groups had worked between 
themselves was well known to the rank and file. Managers earned hefty bribes
through their relationships with contracting companies who supplied them with low
cost and poor quality equipment at inflated prices, needing replacing every two or
three years, and through over-invoicing for the purchase of raw jute. 
In return for turning a blind eye to management corruption, the trade union 
leadership was allowed its own rent-seeking opportunities. Fees were charged on
the thousands of bales of jute delivered to the mills over the year, with each 
production sector under the control of a particular union and hence a particular
political party. The money, ostensibly for the Collective Bargaining Agreement
fund, largely went into pockets of the union leadership. Union leaders earned
bribes for arranging the transition from casual to permanent contracts. They also
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earned loyalty from their supporters through the daily distribution of haziras which
allowed workers to collect their wages without reporting for work, on grounds that
they were engaged in union work. 
Makbul had been one of the beneficiaries of the system within the jute mills. His
cousin had been a vice president of a union and he was rapidly transferred from
casual to permanent status. He soon became a section leader, elected 
unopposed because potential candidates were afraid that ‘if defeated I might 
create various problems for them out of grudge’. For Moqbul, the closure of the
jute mills was more than just a loss of employment, it was the end of his way of
life: 
In all my life, Adamjee’s closure is the most painful incident I have experi-
enced. I had been working there for 22 long years … I come back to
Adamjee-nagar sometimes when I am unable to stand the pain. I stay there
for few days. All meetings and processions have been prohibited here. Almost
everyone has become jobless. I myself cannot find any work. How will I 
maintain the expenses of my family? I cannot even support for my children’s
education any more.
Despite his own privileged position in the unions, he was forthright about the role
they had played in the downfall of the industry:
Labour leaders could do anything they wanted in Adamjee ... They were 
elected to look after the interests of the ordinary worker, but in reality, they did
not bother … The ordinary worker would tell their leaders about their 
problems on various occasions and the leaders would say that they would
ring the authorities on their behalf. But the only time they ever rang the
authority was on their own behalf. The reality is that the authorities and the
union leaders had a mutual interest relationship based on corruption.
Altaf had not had the benefit of Maqbul’s networks. He had paid a bribe of 800
takas to join the mills as a daily labourer over 20 years ago. Without the right 
connections, he could only hope for 3 or 4 days of work in the week, pulling a 
rickshaw for the rest of the week in order to make up his earnings. His overriding
goal was to acquire permanent status and the benefits that went with it and he
focused on working hard and avoiding politics in order to achieve it. However, it
took him 14 years to accumulate the 2500 takas he needed to bribe his way into
the ranks of ad hoc labourer and another 3 years before he was finally given 
permanent status. Within two years of achieving his goal, the mills closed down.
He had worked in the mills for 20 years and left with a redundancy payment of
4,000 takas. He told us why rank and file workers had never protested union 
corruption:
All the labourers knew what was going on in the mills, but their mouths were
shut, everyone was concerned about their jobs. If anyone had spoken out …
they would not have been allowed to enter the premises of Adamjee … There
used to be five trade unions here. If even one of the unions had called for a
movement against the closures, thousands would have joined. Instead the
leadership had meetings with the government, looked after their own interests
and encouraged the government to close down the mill. 
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Ghiyas had worked in Adamjee since 1972. He testified to the partisan conflicts
which underpinned trade union activism in the mills:
The political parities organisations used the ordinary labourers in their 
processions and meetings. Whenever the time for a procession would come,
they would send a truck to Adamjee. The labour organisation most closely
involved with the political party would instruct thousands of workers to stop
their production and to go and join the procession. Those labourers who went
on these processions could collect their wages even without working.
The fact that rank and file workers had so little interaction with the trade union
leadership meant that most had not fully comprehended the degree to which the
unions had been co-opted until they observed their acquiescence to the closure of
the unions. 
It would appear from these accounts that workers in the Adamjee jute mills had no
option but to play by the rules of a highly corrupt system based on collusion
between management and the trade union leadership. These rules also governed
the terms on which they engaged in collective action. Not surprisingly, they had
few illusions about their status as citizens: in fact, for Mokbul, the system within
the factories appeared to be a microcosm of the larger collusion between the
country’s government and its elites at the expense of the poor:
The government never pays any attention to poor people. Its relationship is
with millionaires. It is the rich who are responsible for the closure of the
Adamjee today. They stole the profits while the poor paid the liabilities. 
A similar bitterness towards the rich was expressed by Altaf:
No one helps us because we are poor. Only the poor can understand the pain
of the poor but they do not have the money to help each other. The rich have
become rich by exploiting the poor. We have given them our labour but at the
end of our working lives, they gave us just 4,000 takas. The rich get lakhs of
money without doing anything. If I had a gun, I would kill all the rich people.
2.2 Export garment workers and the new trade unions
The strength of the old trade unions in the Adamjee jute mills had been derived
from the protection provided to the industry since its inception in the 1950s by 
barriers to international competition. The industry proved unable to compete once
these barriers were removed. Exposure to global competition also eroded the
power of the unions over a workforce that was no longer guaranteed jobs for life if
it played by union rules. The export garment sector represented the reverse side
of the globalisation coin.2 It had emerged in response to opportunities thrown up
by economic liberalisation and established its ability to compete globally through
the employment of a ‘flexible’, non-unionised and largely female labour force –
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2 As an ironical footnote to its history, Adamjee Nagar was re-opened as the country’s seventh export 
processing zone in 2006. 
although more men have joined the industry in recent years as it has expanded
from woven garments to more capital intensive knitwear.
All garment factories over a certain size are covered by the country’s labour laws
although these are very unevenly observed. While wages are low compared to
international standards, they are higher than those prevailing in most other jobs
available to poorer women. The international publicity given by coalitions of 
northern trade unions, student activists and concerned consumer groups to 
working conditions in the export garment sector has led to some improvement in
labour standards in the larger factories. In addition, the combined pressure of
international media and local trade unions has forced the BGMEA to set up its
own arbitration cell to respond to workers’ grievances while the government
recently reformed its labour code to bring it in line with current conditions. 
Protests about wages and working conditions within the industry have tended to
be sporadic and highly localised in nature. The reasons for this are not difficult to
understand. A sizeable majority of workers in the industry are relatively recent
migrants from the countryside (Kabeer and Mahmud 2004) and inexperienced in
relation to both factory work and industrial action. There is generally a high level
of demand for these jobs but also a high level of turnover, given the harsh 
discipline enforced on the factory floor. Fluctuations in the international market for
garments also leads to frequent layoffs. Consequently, none of the garment 
workers we interviewed had stayed in any particular factory for any extended 
period of time. Few women stayed in the industry for very long. Most dropped out
after marriage or after their first child, many joining the ranks of informal workers
who make up our third category of urban respondents. There was thus little scope
for developing forms of solidarity with fellow workers that could lead to sustained
forms of collective action. In addition, the constant threat of dismissal hangs over
all workers in an industry in which there is a large pool of unemployed workers
willing to step into their shoes.
The absence of protest also reflects the very low levels of trade union 
membership in the industry (Kabeer and Mahmud 2004). Trade unions are (or
were till very recently) officially banned from the EPZs and actively resisted in the
rest of the export sector ... Employers frequently resort to hired musclemen in
order to intimidate anyone attempting to organise. In any case, trade unions 
themselves do not exercise the clout that they had exercised in the context of 
protected domestic industry. In the current era of footloose capital, the threat of
strikes, walkouts and downing of tools carries with it the danger of factory closure
as buyers relocate their orders to other factories or other countries. The disruptive
tactics associated with traditional trade unions, their partisan politics and 
extortionate behaviour, has little appeal for workers who do not wish to lose their
jobs. 
However, a number of newer unions have emerged which are more closely
focused on the particular needs and constraints of garment workers. They tend to
organise on a neighbourhood rather than a workplace basis and to opt for 
negotiation rather than confrontation. Many work in collaboration with legal rights
NGOs to provide legal training to appraise workers of their labour rights and of the
possibility of redress for their grievances through the labour courts or through the
tripartite adjudication mechanism set up by the Bangladesh Garment
Manufacturers and Exporters Association. 
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While garment workers were unanimous about the unfavourable conditions which
prevailed in their industry, there were variations in their views about their rights as
workers and the possibility and effectiveness of protest. These appeared to reflect
some combination of past history and current experience. In the case of Rafiq, a
male garment worker, a lifetime of injustice had left him with the conviction that
protest was futile. He had begun working from a very young age, first as an 
agricultural labourer in the countryside and then, after migrating into the city, as a
rickshaw puller. He told us how people would often refuse to pay the proper fare
and how some had slapped him when he protested. The garment industry had
offered some relief from such behaviour but it had its own problems. What the
workers resented most was the practice of employers delaying payment of their
salaries or cutting them arbitrarily but few dared to protest. According to Rafiq, it
was because they knew they could be easily replaced and were therefore 
regarded as dispensable labour:
Only the manager, the production manager, the supervisors and floor in
charge staff are paid on time because only they are difficult to replace.
In any case, he considered protest on the part of the poor to be futile:
Who listens to the poor person on the street? … If someone like you makes a
complaint, everyone will believe you. If you go to the police station, the Officer
in Charge will offer you a seat, particularly if you are a related to some 
minister. But if I go, he will not accept my case, he will not even ask me to sit.
He would only have to glance at my clothes to know I was a poor man. The
police only listen to those who have money ... When I pulled a rickshaw, the
police would ask me for bribes. If I could not pay, he would ask to see my
licence, sometimes he would slap me. The police are supposed to provide
protection against oppression but they do not hear the words of the poor.
Jhorna, like Rafiq, had learnt about injustice early in her life. Her family had lost all
their village land because of a disputed claim and their inability to pay the 
necessary bribe to the police. She had also been aware of the discrimination she
suffered as a daughter. She saw little reason to expect justice from others when
she had not got justice from her own father:
There is no use by talking about rights in this country. All my needs and 
complaints, I place it only before all mighty God. He will be the judge of all
this. What else can a poor person do other than praying to God? If I had
money then I surely would have gotten justice. I try to forget about rights. As
a child the rights that I was suppose to get from my father, did I get them? I
could not claim any rights that I had from my father, what rights will the 
government give me? 
She described the oppressive conditions which prevailed in her factory:
Every morning we start at 8. If you are a minute late, salary is cut. I have to
complete 120 items an hour. If I fail to do so, I must work overtime to make
up. There is no system of bonuses or increments so I earn now what I earned
3 years ago.
Her explanation for the lack of protest by workers was that they were mainly
women and had few alternative options in the labour market:
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Most of the labourers here are women. They are also uneducated. So they do
not know how to get organised and how to identify the causes of 
discrimination. Most of them are poor and there are no alternative options for
work. Even for me, it is not possible to take part in any type of protests or
movement. With my low level of education, it is not possible to find a good
job. When I tried for a job as a service worker for a government office, I was
asked to pay a bribe of forty thousand (40,000) taka. Where will I get such an
amount?
Salma’s account of the conditions in her factory was far more informed by the 
language of labour laws than Jhorna’s, possibly because she had a higher level of
education. She spoke of her employers’ failure to pay proper overtime, restrictions
on the use of the toilet, the surveillance of workers through cameras all over the
factory, including the toilet area, the absence of primary health care facilities, 
prohibition of any kind of political discussion within the factory and a ban on trade
unions. Like Rafiq, she explained the absence of protest in terms of the 
dispensability of a work force with easily acquired skills:
These are jobs that anyone could do with a few weeks training. No worker is
given a permanent appointment. Any one who makes any kind of protest can
be sacked immediately because the country has more than enough unskilled
workers looking for unskilled work.
These workers tended to deal with injustices on an individual basis, some leaving
to find other jobs, others carrying out their own negotiations with management.
However, we found some exceptions to this pattern in the case of workers who
had made contact with trade unions and legal rights NGOs. For instance, when
her employer had held back workers’ wages, Halima and some of her fellow 
workers had taken advice from a local trade union and organised a strike. The
police were called in to throw them out but they continued their protest outside:‘we
arranged press conferences, processions and meetings, informed the BGMEA
about our grievances and took the factory authorities to the labour court’. The
movement petered out when the employer persuaded some of the workers to
come back to work. Halima was not taken back as she was regarded as one of
the ringleaders. She believed that the problem for workers lay in their lack of 
consciousness:
After working so long in the garment industry, I have realised this much: that
those who do wrong and those who allow it to happen are equally liable for
the wrongdoing. But the workers have somehow accepted the whole unfair
system in the industry. Those are new to the industry are following in the 
footsteps of those who joined before them. They are forbidden any kind of
political activity. If the workers were conscious, how could such injustices 
continue without protest?
Other workers in our sample believed that some change in consciousness was
taking place, albeit very gradually. Growing international publicity about their 
conditions of work and rising levels of education across the country have meant
that recent cohorts of garment workers are more aware of their rights and the
value of unity than earlier ones. As one female garment leader told us
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Earlier it used to be much more difficult to make the workers understand
about different issues. They would ask many questions. But now they 
understand the importance of organisations, when a worker loses their job but
eventually gets it by filing a case through the labour court they stand to gain
much … Now they understand about the ILO convention and the law, and
they ask for information.
Another woman reported informal forms of solidarity among the workers in her
factory:
If we have any problems we try to talk it through and solve it. We take 
whatever decision seems like the best. Workers on each floor takes a 
decision, all the workers can’t get together. All of us on our floor who were
getting low salaries, we made an agreement that we would not work any
longer. Our hard work had no value, this is what we told all the girls. They
were scared because they could lose their jobs. If we could all do this 
together then our salaries will certainly go up.
Still others had taken part in confrontational forms of collective action:
When I first joined I was told I would not have night duty, but afterwards I
found I had to. When I first started night duty I would get Tk50 daily, later that
became Tk40. We were not paid regularly for the night work. The manager
tried to pacify us by saying we would get our night duty payment today or
tomorrow, but the boys didn’t listen. The manager then went to the MD for the
night bill but the MD called him unfit, at which the manager came back and
told the boys off. The boys then came to the second floor with the knitting
instruments and brought out the ‘finishing’ girls, and went and beat up the
MD. As a result we got our attendance fees. 
It is evident from this account that the confrontation was led by male workers in
the factory. In general, male workers were more likely to report such con-
frontations than female. They were also more likely to report sustained trade
union activism. This is partly because they had greater freedom of movement in
the public domain and could participate in union activities after work and partly
because unions remain male-dominated with very little interest in gender issues
(Dannecker 2002). 
Sakhawat was one of the male workers in our sample who was an active union
member. He had become involved in trade union work very soon after he joined
the industry. He had been involved in a number of protests against unfair 
practices at work, taken his employers to the BGMEA arbitration cell and later to
the labour court, was subsequently beaten up by the employers’ goons and filed a
case against the employer in question, with the support of his trade union. When
the labour court found against him, he took his appeal to the High Court and won,
this time with the backing of BLAST, a legal rights organisation. He believed that
greater respect for workers’ rights in the industry needed combined action on a
number of fronts:
Through government pressure on employers’ associations to respect these
rights; through building up workers’ knowledge of their rights; through the
greater neutrality of BGMEA as the first resort of appeal when disputes rose;
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and finally, through labour organisations that worked in the interests of labour.
Unfortunately, with a few exceptions, most labour organisations have become
subordinates of the employers’ associations.
2.3 Self employed workers and microfinance organisations
Most of the women who work in the garment industry had migrated from the 
countryside in search of work. They lived in the slum neighbourhoods of Dhaka
alongside other migrants from various districts of the country who had been
‘pushed’ from their villages by loss of land and dearth of employment or drawn by
the possibility of casual work in the urban informal economy. As we noted earlier,
urban slum dwellers have been victims of deliberate policy neglect by successive
governments, reluctant to target any efforts to reduce poverty or provide services
to urban areas for fear of giving the inhabitants a sense of permanency and 
security that would encourage further migration (Banks 2006). Periodic evictions
by government on grounds of illegal occupation has discouraged investments in
these areas by individuals and NGOs. In addition, urban slum dwellers are
exposed to a wide range of hazards which typify the environment in which they
live. Along with fires, theft, traffic accidents and so on, slum dwellers also find
themselves at the mercy of the musclemen, criminals and gangs that terrorise the
local population, often acting on behalf of powerful land owners and politicians
(Wood and Salway 2000). 
Working women in urban slums were generally confined to a restricted range of
activities: waged work in garment factories or small workshops, domestic service,
petty trade and home-based work. Men pulled rickshaws or engaged in petty
trade. We interviewed 15 women who reported some association with the 
development NGOs active in the urban slums. Most were associated with less
well known minimalist MFOs, although a number of women also reported contacts
with the more socially oriented NGOs, including Nijera Kori, Proshika and
ActionAid. Women borrowers tended to use their loans in one of two ways. One
was the purchase of rickshaws, either to be pulled by their husbands or sons or to
be rented out. The other was the construction of additional ‘room(s)’ – mainly
makeshift shelters – to rent out. Only a small minority of women in our sample
used their loans to start up or expand a trade or enterprise. Our interviews were
carried soon after a ban had been imposed by the BNP government on the plying
of rickshaws in the major (‘VIP’) streets of Dhaka. This had dealt a severe blow to
those households who relied in pulling, renting in or renting out rickshaws for their
livelihoods and featured frequently in their accounts. 
Although NGOs are considered to provide better services than government by
slum dwellers, the failure of most NGOs to address the basic need for security of
shelter among urban slum-dwellers together with negative experiences with some
of the microfinance organisations, including unregistered ones, has led to a high
level of mistrust towards NGOs in general (Banks 2006). The women we spoke to
had mixed views about the benefits of microfinance. As might be expected, those
who had benefited were more favourably disposed. They told us that they were
too poor to save for investment purposes and their only option in times of crisis in
the past had been to borrow on usurious terms. They considered microfinance a
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boon because it charged lower rates of interest than moneylenders. Aside from
coping with crisis, it also allowed them to purchase productive assets. For others,
however, it had proved to be a double-edged sword, increasing their assets but
trapping them in debt when their assets were stolen, burnt or lost through any one
of the other hazards of life in the urban slums. 
None of the women considered their association with minimalist MFOs as 
anything other than a business relationship. The MFOs in question also saw
themselves as purely financial intermediaries. They restricted themselves to the
disbursement of loans and collection of repayments, making instrumental use of
the group-based approach to guarantee loan repayments rather than to create the
basis of new social networks among the poor. Their clients had little contact with
the organisations beyond weekly meeting to repay their loans and learnt little from
them beyond basic financial skills. 
It was evident that their tenuous affiliation with these organisations had done little
to promote awareness of rights. Najma Begum had borrowed money from several
of these organisations, but had never received any advice from them. She said
she knew nothing about rights. She only knew what she needed but she had no
reason to believe that the government would ever listen to someone like her:
I do not know what sort of right I can claim from the country and government.
But if the government would gives us good business and adequate gas for
cooking, then it will be helpful for us. But how can we approach the 
government to make these demands. The government will not listen to a 
person like me. It will only listen to rich people only. I will never be able to
meet Khaleda Zia, and also I cannot even speak properly. People in our area
are scared of the government; they are worried about the government 
sending army to capture our local people… The people of government will not
listen to us either. If anyone complains about anything then police will arrest
us. We do not know much about the law and order of the country. Police will
only ask for the bribe. That is why everybody just want to stay far away from
all these difficulties.
A similar ignorance about rights was expressed by Shathi:
I do not know about the rights that I can claim from the government but there
are many problems in our daily life which could be solved if the government
paid attention. The price of all sorts of goods has become very high yet the
government is not taking any step to address this. The government has also
banned rickshaws from Dhaka city when our family expense is mainly run by
the income from rickshaws. Please tell the government not to ban the 
rickshaw. Government will not listen to us … If they had heard our voices,
they could have never done this.
Women borrowers who had also come into contact with socially oriented NGOs
were in a position to compare these different sets of affiliations. One example of
this was provided by Ayesha Akhter. She had borrowed money from a number of
microfinance organisations and believed that it had benefited her economically:
It is true that the NGOs do business by giving loans, but I have profited from
them. I had no capital with which I could have done any type of savings 
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oriented work. But as I received a good sum of money at a time, from the
NGOs, I was able to earn a good amount too. Currently I have borrowed only
from ASA. 
However, she expressed her anger at the reactions of most of the MFOs to the
anti-eviction struggles of slum dwellers in the late 1990s. Many had suspended
their lending operations for fear of defaults. Some had remained only because
they had been persuaded by the argument that default rates on loans would be
much higher if the evictions took place.3 A few had participated in the anti-eviction
struggles but had attempted to take over the platform that slum dwellers had set
up by themselves for their own political purposes. The movement had died out in
2001: the election of the BNP government, its use of the army and the police, 
purportedly to round up criminals, and its prosecution of a number of NGOs on
grounds of political partisanship, all served to intimidate the slum dwellers, leaving
them ‘with no language with which to protest’. 
Ayesha had also come into contact with a number of socially active NGOs like
Nijera Kori, Proshika and ActionAid. She singled out Nijera Kori in particular as
having taken the side of the slum dwellers in their struggles against eviction rather
than seeking to make political capital out of it.4 She considered the slum evictions
to be part of a strategy on the part of the government to redistribute land from the
poor to the rich, another symptom of the ongoing disenfranchisement of the poor:
During the time of election, we told the leaders of different political parties that
we want a permanent solution for this slum. They all gave us promises that if
they could go to the power then they would give us the land of this slum 
permanently and would make more development of this area. However, when
the BNP government came to power, they did not give us our land. They
evicted many of us and let their people build home there. The development of
slum is going on but it is not for our benefit. It is for the benefit of the rich …
The government will build plots in these slums and sell them off to rich 
people. Why should all the plots go to the rich, are we not also citizens of this
country? Let them give us some of the plots too. We will slowly and gradually
pay the money to the government in instalments. If we can pay our loans to
NGOs on time, then why can’t we do this as well? 
Her contact with the socially oriented NGOs had alerted her to the importance of
consciousness and unity among the poor if their struggles were to be effective,
but she did not hold out much hope that this would happen and she saw no point
in talk about rights:
Society could be changed if all the poor could protest on a united basis. But
the poor do not understand this, they lack consciousness. I have understood
it by mixing with many people and by becoming a member of different NGOs. 
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3 In Sultan’s study of anti-eviction struggles in a squatter settlement in Dhaka (1999), women 
respondents reported that it was only after they threatened to stop paying off their loans that NGO 
workers began to pay attention to their concerns. 
4 The women interviewed in Sultan’s study also singled out Nijera Kori as the only NGO they had 
encountered that provided political support in their anti-eviction struggles rather than behaving like 
businesses (p. 220; Fn.2)
Nilu Begum also believed that her understanding of the world had changed as a
result of her interactions with Nijera Kori. She told us that she had grown up
accepting her fate without question:
Ever since my childhood, I saw that when a girl grew up and became 12 or
13, she marries and her world revolves around managing the household … I
have seen my grandmother, my mother and my aunts, they all did the same.
But she found herself changing: ‘I am an illiterate woman, so was my mother. But
I have dreams for my children which my mother never had for us’. She had not
been able to send her older son and daughter to school but was determined to
educate her youngest daughter till college level. She believed that these changes
had come about as a result of her association with Nijera Kori She had cut off her
relationships with other NGOs: 
Because with other NGOs, I only have a relationship of borrowing money, but
with Nijera Kori, it is a different story because they have made me aware of
so many things.
This growing awareness did not translate into optimism about changes in the
wider domain:
I am somewhat aware of my rights but I do not enjoy them. How are we going
to protest? The army arrests innocent people. No one can make a procession
or meeting for fear. The government leaders use our vote to get into power
but they are the ones who impoverish us.
What was striking about the narratives of these self-employed women, both those
who had become knowledgeable about their rights and those who remained igno-
rant, was their pervasive sense of alienation, the sense that no-one was listening
to them. Equally striking was that the extent to which their expressions of despair,
disenfranchisement and injustice revolved around the equation between money
and power: all talk about rights is useless, only money has a voice.
A number of them referred to the vast gulf that separated rich and poor. According
to Shathi, the rich appeared to inhabit a different universe:
We live with dirt and garbage the whole day. If they come into contact with us,
they get sick. Whenever they are passing by the slum area they put hand-
kerchief to their nose … 
According to Jhorna:
Rich people think of the poor as the shoes of their feet. Just as they never
clean their shoes unless it is needed and throw them away in the dustbin
once their need is over, rich people also use the poor in the same manner.
The belief that ‘only money has a voice’ was widespread. It appeared to many that
money could buy anything of value in society, from the most trivial to the most 
significant: 
l Shahida observed that it could buy a place at the head of the queue in the 
doctor’s clinic: ‘When it comes to medical treatment, poor people have to buy 
a ticket in order to stand in a queue to see the doctor. Rich people can just 
IDS WORKING PAPER 331
27
get out of their cars and see the doctor, without even buying a ticket. In fact, I 
may not even get to see the doctor after having bought my ticket but the rich 
see him any time they want’.
l Mossamet maintained that it could buy justice: ‘You have to pay a bribe to get
anything done. If I have a problem and I seek justice, then I will have to pay a
bribe. I am a citizen of this country, my vote has helped to elect the ward 
commissioner but if I go to him to get a certificate, I will be told that he is 
busy, he is out of the office. If I go to his office for any reason at all, the 
gatekeeper will send me away because I do not have a car, yet I have seen 
how the same guard will salute those who have a car. However, if I were to 
offer a hundred rupee bribe, I would get my certificate straightaway’. 
l Some believed it had bought off the leadership of the poor. According to 
Rohimonn: ‘No one will protest the ban on rickshaws because our leaders are
nothing but a bunch of thieves. If they are given a bribe, they will tell us that 
there is no need to go for movements’.
l Rabeya Khatun believed that it could buy the poor themselves: ‘No one 
protest against any injustice. It takes money even to mount a protest. If there 
is no money, no one will be with you. The poor are the hostages of money.
You can make a poor person do any wrong by paying him just a 10 taka’. 
l Shahida described the traps that kept poor people in poverty and undermined
their unity: ‘I do understand this much that there is no unity among the people
of the slum. They all are scattered. Dr Kamal Hossain organised a movement 
for the slums and that made our force stronger but we did not elect him when 
the time came. Instead we elected someone who is the biggest thief in the 
country. The poor have only themselves to blame for remaining poor. We do 
not understand our own welfare and we get caught in different traps … the 
need of money keeps us trapped’. 
l And in Rizia’s view, poverty turned the poor into criminals: ‘People are 
flooding into the city in search of work, some live in the slums, some sleep in 
the streets. Acute poverty has given rise to increase in theft, robbery, extortion
and terrorism. People may not have work but they still have hunger. This 
hunger has turned them into criminals. You can make a street tokai do any
thing for ten takas’.
There was widespread disillusionment with the government. According to Ayesha,
the government’s decision to ban rickshaws was evidence that it was in the 
pocket of the rich:
The government has taken the decision to ban rickshaws because of rich
people. So this is the government of the rich … My daughter used to study in
Gonobhaban school but since they have banned rickshaw, she cannot go
there as I do not have money to pay for baby taxi.
Shahida held the same view:
Rickshaws have been banned from the VIP roads in Dhaka City. I don’t know
what VIP is but no rickshaw can move on the VIP road, only cars can. I
believe that was done for the rich people because it is rich who ride the cars. 
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Few had faith in the political system and in the power of the vote to change 
anything. As Rohimon put it:
Every election we cast our votes. Every election, the political leaders and their
workers come to beg for our votes and when it is over, they are gone as well.
How are they going to look out for us? They are too busy managing their own
fortunes.
In Jahanara’s view, the rot in the system began with the country’s leaders and
radiated downwards to all aspects of social life:
In a country where the government is constantly lying, why shouldn’t the
police take bribes and the mastaan (hired musclemen) terrorise people? …
There is no need for any political party in this country because they are the
ones that are creating terrorist groups … With one signature, crores of takas
can be stolen, with one signature and the stroke of a pen, crores of money
belonging to the country can be ‘lost’. My husband is learning to drive but
even to get a driving licence he will need to pay a bribe of 5,000 takas. The
rich steal everything and exploit everyone in this country. If they could be
destroyed before they destroy us, the country might develop. They hate us,
they call our children names like ‘basteer polapan’ [slum children]. Just
because we live in the slum, does it mean that we are not human beings? 
However, a somewhat less pessimistic view of the democratic process was 
provided by Fatema. She was a long-standing member of Proshika and it was
clear that her experience in an organisation with a firm social agenda had given
her a more hopeful view of the future:
Our vote is the right through which we can express what you think. We are
citizens. The vote helps us to elect a competent person for the development
of the country. The present situation of our country makes me realise that
unless people from our own class can go to the power, there will be no 
development of our class … Now we realise we need to elect somebody from
among us. Honest and genuine people cannot win the elections at present.
The election is run by black money to earn more black money. Competent
people stand for the election but it is the incompetent candidates who win the
election now. Now that we are realising this, we will elect people from the
same situation as us in the future.
2.4 The limits to collective action in the urban context
This section has sought to examine how different categories of poor people in
urban areas talked about themselves and their place in society as well as the
implications of their association with various forms of civil society organisations for
their consciousness and capacity for collective action. We restricted our attention
to categories of the urban workforce who were in contact with ‘chosen’ forms of
association which could provide them with the critical distance from the taken-for-
granted inequalities of their ‘communities of birth’. It is evident from our analysis
that most of the associations that featured in our study did little to challenge these
inequalities. 
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While trade unions are regarded within some of the labour studies literature as the
primary means through which workers can express and fight for their interests, in
Bangladesh, they are primarily regarded as vehicles of party politics (Dannecker
2002; Khan 2001). All the major trade unions are affiliated to the main political
parties in the country and act along partisan lines rather than in the interests of
their membership. They use their political clout when their parties are in power to
engage in the bribery, corruption and extortion practices that were endemic in the
political system while using their associational clout at other time to extract gains
for the union leadership. 
This rent seeking behaviour was most obviously in evidence in the older 
nationalised jute industry which had grown up behind tariff barriers which 
protected the industry from global competition. Unions in this sector had been
able to exercise considerable power, knowing that employers had little choice but
to deal with them. The largely male-dominated permanent workforce were the 
primary beneficiaries of unions in this sector. They had either actively colluded
with the union leadership or remained silent in the face of its corruption through
fear of losing what were relatively privileged jobs, the hope of moving from casual
to permanent status or the possibility of rising within the union hierarchy. With the
closure of the Adamjee jute mills as part of a broader programme of privatisation,
these older style unions have lost a great deal of their economic power.
The new export oriented industries represents a very different environment for
union activity. Because their global competitiveness depends on keeping wages
low and production flexible, employers in this sector sought out a ‘docile’, largely
female workforce from the countryside with no prior experience of union 
organisation. They also actively resisted union activity on their premises. At the
same time, we did find evidence that a number of the conventional trade unions
were beginning to turn their attention to challenges of organising female workers.
We also found evidence of the emergence of new kinds of labour organisations,
some women only, that were evolving new strategies for protecting workers’ rights.
These unions organised on a neighbourhood rather than workplace basis and
placed a lot of emphasis on training workers in their legal rights. However, while
consciousness about their rights may have been increasing among garment 
workers, willingness to act appeared to be confined to a minority of garment 
workers. The rest were too afraid of jeopardising their jobs to protest their working
conditions. 
The other major form of civil society association in the lives of the urban working
poor in our sample were the development NGOs, of which it was mainly the 
minimalist MFOs that were active in the slums. As we saw, these limited 
themselves to financial transactions with their membership, concentrating on 
disbursing and recovering loans. They offered little by way of education or training
and even less by way of support to their clients in the face of government actions
which directly harmed the poor. It was only the few of the women in our sample
who were in contact with the more socially-oriented NGOs who reported being
treated as citizens rather than simply as borrowers. These belonged to Proshika,
Action Aid and Nijera Kori. We also found some evidence from our sample 
interviews of sporadic support provided by legal organisations like BLAST and
ASK, providing them with advice in disputes with employers or husbands and
helping them to go to court, if necessary.
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To sum up, therefore, we did not find much evidence that the ‘chosen’
associations that we set out to explore had given rise to an awareness of shared
interests among their members and the willingness to take collective action,
except on a sporadic basis. On the other hand, neither did we find evidence of the
‘natural deference-authority dyads’ that Wood describes as a pervasive feature of
Bangladesh society. What we found instead was an active awareness of the 
injustices of the system among different sections of the working poor and 
vociferous condemnation of those who perpetrated them. The language of rights
did not come naturally to all our respondents, the language of citizenship even
less so. It was against the benchmark of justice that they expressed their anger at
the treatment meted out to them by those in power. If they were ‘prisoners’ of this
system, they were prisoners with a well-developed analysis of the nature of their
prison. Their views had a great deal in common with the general academic 
literature on ‘bad governance’ in Bangladesh but revolved around the power of the
cash nexus to a much greater extent than the power of patronage. It was 
consequently suffused with a much greater sense of ‘class-like’ antagonism
towards the rich than is generally to be found in this academic literature. 
Our analysis of the situation of the working poor in urban areas strongly suggests
that formal multi-party democracy and the right to vote on its own cannot deliver
substantive citizenship rights in a context where the political system is itself a part
of the problem, where partisan politics divides trade union membership and where
votes, justice and the leadership of the poor can all be purchased by those who
have the money. Aside from a few scattered socially-oriented NGOs and some of
the newer unions, there is little evidence of any organisational effort to build a
countervailing force for change among the poor.
The likelihood that such organisations will emerge in the near future also seems
remote. On the one hand, the lives and livelihoods of the urban poor are marked
by too many interruptions and discontinuities to allow the emergence of a stable
sense of collective identity and interests. The majority of those we interviewed
were migrants who had left behind their communities of birth but had failed to
develop alternative communities of choice: they seldom lived in any place to
develop ties of neighbourhood and earned their living through a variety of short-
term, casual and irregular forms of work which offered little possibility for building
up longer term relationships of solidarity. 
On the one hand, the state appears to be engaged in a war of attrition with urban
slum-dwellers, using the coercive tactics at its disposal to drive through a variety
of policies which threaten their shelter and undermine their livelihoods. This has
made it very difficult for organisations interested in social mobilisation to operate
in urban areas. Nijera Kori, for instance, who had been working in Dhaka slums
from 1983 withdrew from urban areas after the slum evictions in 1999. Despite
court orders defending slum dwellers’ right, the political party in power used its
thugs to terrorise slum dwellers and ‘accidentally’ set their house on fire till they
finally managed to clear the last slum in which NK had been work.5 Their group
members were dispersed all over the city, making it hard for them to maintain their
ties with each other.
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3 ‘On becoming a citizen’: 
associational life and collective 
action in the rural context
3.1 Socially-oriented NGOs and ‘citizenship by design’
The picture that emerged from our rural narratives was far more positive. This
partly relates to the nature of the rural sample. We purposively focused on three
NGOs that had an explicit social orientation, unlike the minimalist microfinance
organisations that dominated in the urban areas. However, there are reasons why
the social mobilisation efforts of NGOs have been more successfully sustained in
rural areas compared to urban. The lives of our rural respondents were relatively
more stable than those of our urban respondents. The majority of them had been
living in their present locations for most of their lives, many had been born there.
Even those who had migrated to their current location because they had lost their
ancestral land through debt, fraud, crisis or river erosion had done so several
years ago. Most saw themselves as continuing to live in the same place for the
foreseeable future. As a result, membership of the three NGOs from which we
drew our rural sample extended, in many cases, over several years. Their 
members knew each other well and had become known as group members to the
wider community. It was on the basis of this far more stable membership that the
three organisations sought to pursue their goals. 
There were some similarities but important differences between BRAC, on the one
hand, and Nijera Kori and Samata on the other. All three organised their members
into groups which met on a weekly basis. All three put a great deal of emphasis
on training in practical matters and legal rights. However, while BRAC focused on
a combination of microfinance and other forms of service provision, both NK and
Samata had eschewed a service provision role and concentrated on social 
mobilisation. 
BRAC’s groups, called Village Organisations, are open to women only. They 
consist of around 45 to 55 members and are organised around the provision of
microfinance services and livelihoods training. For borrowing and lending 
purposes, however, the Village Organisations are divided into smaller groups of
around 5 members who are responsible for monitoring loans and ensuring 
repayments. BRAC draws its membership from landless or land-poor families who
earn their living from smallholder or tenancy farming, petty trade, rickshaw pulling
and the variety of other occupations which allowed those in rural areas with little
or no skills or land to earn a living. The focus on microfinance provision has
meant that BRAC recruits its members largely from the moderate, rather than
extreme poor. The VOs hold gram sabhas on monthly basis to raise awareness
about specific issues, build the confidence of members and develop their 
5 The land was later developed for various government and donor offices, including those of the ADB 
and World Bank. 
IDS WORKING PAPER 331
32
leadership skills. Members of the Village Organisations within a single ward
formed a Polli Samaj which met on a bi-monthly basis and acted as a forum for
the discussion of various forms of injustice and how to deal with them. BRAC has
had a legal rights and legal support programme in place since 1986. 
There were greater similarities between Samata and Nijera Kori. Both recruit their
membership from the ranks of landless and near-landless who must earn a living
by selling their labour. These tend to come from poorer households than members
of BRAC. Both work with women as well as men, organising them into separate
groups. Neither engages in any form of service delivery. They tend to regard NGO
provision of microcredit with some hostility on the grounds that it detracts from
their capacity to engage in advocacy for better public provision of basic services
for the poor. Both promote regular saving activities by group members. Members
are encouraged to use their funds to finance individual emergency or investment
needs as well as collective productive and political activities. Groups are 
organised into federated structures so that associational affiliation extends beyond
the boundaries of their villages. A great deal of emphasis is placed on intensive
training activities covering a wide range of social, legal and cultural issues as well
as training in collective action. Training methodologies draw on the pedagogic
approach of Paulo Freire, elements of Marxist class analysis and cultural 
repertoires which borrow from people’s movements in the Indian context. 
The explicit focus on rights in all three organisations provide us with some idea of
what purposively designed processes to promote citizenship identity and practices
at grassroots level might look like in the context of Bangladesh. That the process
had achieved some degree of success is evident in the fact that while many of our
rural respondents spoke of barriers to their citizenship that were very similar to
those encountered by the urban poor, many of these barriers were spoken of in
the past tense, of barriers overcome. In other words, they saw themselves as 
citizens, or at least in transition to citizenship, to a greater extent than did our
urban sample. 
However, it was evident from our interviews that differences in organisational
strategies had given rise to somewhat different trajectories of change in the lives
of membership of these organisations and somewhat different engagements in
collective action. Broadly speaking, the fact that BRAC worked with women-only
groups and focused on explicitly gender-related issues (dowry, polygamy, child
marriage, violence against women) in its training may explain why its members
tended to confine their collective action to gender-related issues. Furthermore,
their lower levels of activism may have reflected the fact that BRAC’s micro-
finance transactions took up a great deal of time during weekly group meetings
and social awareness training was generally confined to monthly discussions. 
Struggles over land rights had dominated the early years of NK and Samata. The
focus on land rights brought their members into direct, often violent confrontation
with local elites. On other issues as well, they were far more likely than BRAC
members to engage in direct and visible forms of collective action, including
demonstrations, pickets, strikes, petitions and so on. However, women’s
participation in these collective actions has led over time to greater attention on
the part of both organisations to gender equality so that the collective actions of
their membership has been increasingly directed at violations of women’s rights.
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Training is given a central role in these organisations and while men and women
were trained in separate groups, the topics covered were wide-ranging and
addressed the structural roots of poverty and injustice in gender, class and other
social hierarchies. In the next sections, we draw out some of the commonalities
and differences in the approaches taken by these organisations in their work with
poor people and the implications these have for their identity and agency as 
citizens. 
3.2 Competing routes to economic empowerment: markets and
movements
The most obvious difference between BRAC, on the one hand, and Nijera Kori
and Samata, on the other, relates to their strategies for promoting the livelihoods
of their membership. BRAC promotes access to markets as its primary route to
economic empowerment. Microfinance services occupy a central role in its 
strategy along with various kinds of practical information and skills: ‘how to make
better profit through poultry; also know about polio vaccination of the children, and
various legal matters too’. The drive for financial sustainability over the past
decade or so has meant that the programme has gravitated towards the 
moderately poor.6 Some commentators suggest that the preoccupation with loan
repayments has affected the organisation’s ability to promote social change
among its membership (Montgomery 1998; Goetz and Sen Gupta 1996). 
BRAC members in our sample generally invested their loans in traditionally female
activities that can be carried out close to the home, such as handicraft production
and raising livestock and poultry. Others gave their loans to their husbands. In
addition, we came across a number of women in less traditional activities: setting
up their own shops or engaging in door-to-door trading. The economic benefits
from loans provided by BRAC have been well documented in the literature: they
include increases in household income and assets as well as investments in 
children’s health and education (Hashemi et al. 1996; Halder 2003; Khandker
1998). They were also testified to by the women in our sample: some had been
able to buy land and build houses, others had expanded into new livelihood 
activities, others have accumulated savings. 
Samata and NK differed radically in their approach to economic empowerment,
not only from BRAC but also from the vast majority of development-oriented
NGOs in Bangladesh. They were among the remaining handful of organisations
that prioritised social mobilisation rather than accepting a service delivery role.
Both had adopted an early version of what would now be called a ‘rights-based
approach’ to economic empowerment. They used training and discussion within
group meetings to promote collective reflection and analysis of the structural roots
of poverty and inequality in Bangladesh, to strengthen members’ awareness of
their rights as workers, peasants and citizens and to mobilise their members to
take collective action on issues of concern to them. 
6 BRAC has separate programmes for the very poor which combine food transfers, savings and skills 
training.
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Struggles over land featured centrally in the early history of both organisations.
Many of their members had been born landless, others had become landless as a
result of litigation, fraud, debt or river erosion. The movements of the rivers in
Bangladesh are deeply implicated in the politics of land struggles: river erosion
renders some families landless while the formation of new char lands, rights to
which are unclear, become a major source of contestation. When the government
designates these newly emerging land to be ‘khas land’ (unutilised govern-
ment-held land), it becomes available for distribution to the landless. However,
most landless families were not aware of these entitlements and were, in any
case, powerless to claim them. It was through their association with Samata and
Nijera Kori that these families learnt about their entitlements. 
Samata began its operations in an area in which the government’s decision to
drain a large beel or lake in the early 1960s had led to the emergence of new land
which it declared would be distributed to the landless. Landless families in the
area began to drain and clear the land for cultivation but lost out to local landlords
who forcibly occupied the land and hired them as wage labourers. As Abdur
Rahim told us:
Our fathers and forefathers would cultivate the land, they would clear the 
jungle and plant paddy and every year the jotedar’s people would take away
the harvest. We were never able to protest.
Land reform initiatives after independence gave legal entitlement to the beel land
to local landless families but few either knew about it or had the courage to claim
the land. As Momena recalled, it was through Samata that she and other landless
families in the village learnt that the law could be used to promote the rights of the
poor as well as wielded against them. Samata took group members to Tehsil
office and the AC Land office to examine all the records in regards to khas land.
The TNO and the government surveyors were invited to measure the drained land
and establish its status as khas land. Once this was done, landless groups were
able to demand that their landlords provide documents proving their entitlement. 
Resistance by landlords led to over a decade of confrontation, often violent. When
the landlords’ musclemen were routed in physical confrontations, they resorted to
legal harassment. False cases were lodged against Samata members, often 
several at a time. These made no reference to the legality of otherwise of their
claims to land but accused them of various criminal acts, including rape, violence
against women, murder, extortion and so on rather. The accused would be tied up
in court cases over extended periods of time and sometimes gaoled for a number
of years. Group savings and organisational support helped them to survive but it
was not till the mid-1990s that they finally began to get full ownership of the land. 
Nijera Kori group members from the char areas of Noakhali, where there were
large tracts of disputed land, had similar stories to tell. Although the government
had declared these lands to be khas and hence available for redistribution, there
was little the landless could do to claim their entitlements. Maleka Begum recalled
the lawlessness that had prevailed in Char Jabbar when her family had first
moved into the area: ‘people were afraid to come to this area, it was a dangerous
environment’. They faced constant demands for toll money from local industrial
elites and landlords backed by threat of forcible seizure of their livestock and 
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possessions if they failed to pay. The landlords had formed their own ‘lathial 
bahini’ (armed force) from some of the ‘money-hungry’ families among the 
landless to assist them in these operations. 
NK had arrived in the area to provide relief after a major cyclone in 1985 and
stayed on to organise the landless. The elites had till then taken it for granted that
landless families in the area could be bought off or terrorised into submission. The
fierce confrontations that ensued took them by surprise:
They did not have any idea that the poor, whose only means of survival is
land, would defend their land with the last ounce of blood.
Women took the lead in confrontations with the police on a number of occasions:
We were not afraid of confronting the police and local administration. In a
place like Noakhali, where women rarely went out of the house, we discarded
our burkah and took up brooms and sticks in our hands. In the face of our
resistance to their hired goons, the industrialists began to lay charges of 
violence against women against the men in our area.
By the mid-1990s, the jotedars began to weary of the confrontations and landless
groups began the process of taking over the land.
The active part taken by women in the struggles over land served to raise the
level of gender awareness within these organisations. The women’s groups in the
organisations protested when they found that there was no provision to include
them in land allocation process. In response, both NK and Samata adopted the
demand for joint entitlement in their struggles for land. Many male members were
also affected by women’s participation in the land struggles. It brought home to
them their own internalisation of social norms about women’s inferiority. Abdur
Rahman told us:
Before joining Samata. I hardly recognised women’s roles. We really had no
idea that women worked as hard as we did in running the family. Now I
realise that our family is a result of our joint effort. When we received two
bighas of land in 1994, it was in both our names … I now believe that land
should be allotted jointly in the name of both husband and wife.
Akkas was similarly influenced by his experiences with Samata:
In the past, I used to behave badly with my wife, I used to beat her if I did not
get my meals on time. But during our movement I saw women help us in so
many ways. They were behind us with bricks, pebbles, water and food …
They had so much love and affection for us. How then could we not show
them affection in return. Everyone associated with Samata regards women as
human beings.
Along with the joint entitlement to the khas land that was allocated to his family,
he had also bought a small parcel of land, half of which he had registered in his
wife’s name. 
Not all forms of collective action in the economic domain had the life-and-death
quality of these struggles over land but they all relied on the power of collective
action that the landless groups had learnt to bring to their demands. Samata’s
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women’s groups had campaigned successfully to ensure that public works 
programmes in their locality filled the quota of jobs reserved for women. Both NK
and Samata groups had gone on strike for higher wages or to resist wage cuts. In
some cases, they did not win their demands and group members found 
themselves isolated as their fellow strikers gave into their employers’ threats or
blandishments. In other cases, where their associations covered neighbouring 
villages, it was far more difficult for landlords to find wage labour from outside the
village. In still other villages, they had managed to persuade labourers brought in
from outside to refuse to work unless they were paid the wages the groups were
demanding. Regardless of these outcomes, one major change that was widely
reported was the behaviour of the wealthy towards their labourers. According to
Nasir, protests by NK groups meant that the earlier practice of holding back pay
had been stopped. Now they were given their pay at the end of the working day:
‘The importance of our word has increased’. 
3.3 Improving access to justice
All three of the NGOs in our sample were active in the arena of law and justice.
They provided training in legal rights, supported group action in the face of 
injustice and assisted members who wanted to take grievance to court. These
activities have had considerable impact on the self-confidence of group members.
Mossamet Fatema told us about how things had been in her village before BRAC
had arrived:
Before becoming members of BRAC, the women of this group had no 
confidence. They were not even aware of their own rights. Most village
women are illiterate. They do not go out of the house, and therefore do not
have any solid conception about the world beyond. Although I myself have
always had courage, even when I was a child, I did not understand about
many issues. I had no idea about the extent of discrimination against women.
She described how change had come about:
People gain knowledge on different subjects through discussions and 
interactions with other people. As a result, women have slowly started to
come out of their world of housework … I came to know about women’s rights
after becoming a member.
She found herself questioning practices she had taken for granted before:
I now know that women face discrimination in marriage, that it is a crime to
give or take dowry. Before, no woman ever got married without giving dowry.
Now, through the involvement of group members, a number of marriages
have taken place without dowry.
Fatema provided an example of how BRAC group members approached gender
injustices within the community:
Many men beat their wives, especially in relation to dowry. Our group 
members first sit with the husband and wife and try to solve the problem
through discussion. We try to make them realise that both giving and taking
dowry are social crimes. We tell them that the law forbids dowry.
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If they were not able to solve the problem within the group, they turned to BRAC’s
legal assistance centre which provided advice and support to the aggrieved party.
These experiences meant that many BRAC members were knowledgeable on
such matters as how to file a case, whether or not the kabin at marriage had been
properly fixed and whether marriage fee was appropriate. 
NK and Samata combine their training in legal rights with a structural analysis of
socioeconomic injustice. Their membership engaged in a wider variety of 
collective actions than those of BRAC, challenging class and gender injustices as
well as taking on religious discrimination and environmental concerns. Jobeda
(Samata) described how her group members had campaigned against various
manifestations of gender injustice within the community – and the changes that
had taken place: 
Men and women are equal, but many different kinds of violence and 
oppression are done against women in our society, talak [divorce], fatwas,
dowry and so on. By not letting women go outside of their house, men are
committing severe injustice against them. No women in this area used to go
out without burkha. We have made processions, given speeches in the
bazaar against such practices. Now we have come out and have realised that
cooking is not the only job for women. To be able to study and work is also
her right. Aside from the fundamental rights, a woman has the right to move
around on the streets, to speak her mind and to hold jobs. There was a time
when I used to wear burkha too. After joining the landless association, I have
given up wearing it.
NK and Samata group members also took active part in the shalish, the traditional
village-level forum for dealing with conflict. These tend to be dominated by village
elites and their adjudications loaded in favour of the elites and their followers. The
growing strength of NK and Samata groups has meant that their members are
routinely invited to participate in shalish proceedings. Furthermore, where the 
traditional mechanism was found to be unsatisfactory and where the group 
presence was sufficiently strong, the organisations set up their own alternative
forums for dispute resolution or turned to the Chairman and other elected 
members to convene the shalish on their behalf. 
The NGOs had thus succeeded in setting up alternative mechanisms for 
dispensing justice which were not only seen to be more impartial, but also carried
sufficient legitimacy to command the reluctant acceptance of the elites. In some
cases, it was the threat that landless groups would refuse to work for those who
did not abide by the verdict that led to this acceptance. In other cases, it was the
threat to take a case to court, with the expensive and time-consuming procedures
this would entail. The availability of a justice mechanism that is not loaded in
favour of the rich and powerful has played an important role in building 
organisational support among the poor, particularly those who had direct 
experience of the unjust treatment that had been meted out to the poor. A number
of our respondents told us that they had joined these organisations because of
their memory of past injustice. 
It has been of particular importance for women, given that the traditional shalish
had long been used to shore up male domination. As Jobeda from Nijera Kori put
it:
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The woman whose husband is refusing to support her, she will not get justice
form the village leaders. Instead they will accuse her of some fault that led to
her husband’s behaviour. Now nobody approaches the village leaders.
Because women cannot be of much help to them, the village leaders do not
see any fault in men. They look for a yardstick to decide whose side to take
and their yardstick is power.
The existence of organisations whose members are prepared to stand up to 
injustice has also had repercussions within the community. According to
Mossamet Akther from BRAC:
When people outside our associations hear that we are capable of solving
these dowry disputes, they also come to us. At first, we members try to solve
it by ourselves. If we fail, then the legal assistance division tries to give 
different kind of legal aid to the bride’s side. Such as: filing a case, claiming
for the allowance of feeding clothing and sheltering. People of this area know
that our group members play important roles in solving different problems. As
a result, they come to us for advice regarding various situations. 
Evidence that the wider community had begun to recognise the legitimacy of
these alternative systems of justice was to be found in the changing attitudes of
the village elites towards the poor. Nurjehan told us that she had complained to
the village head when her landlord had beaten her son because she had decided
to stop working for him. When she was ignored, she took her complaint to Samata
group members who carried out their own shalish and fined the landlord 1,000
takas. The landlord was forced to pay as he feared that others to might refuse to
work for him: ‘This was when the village elite began to realise that the groups
were becoming powerful. This judgement made us stronger’.
Arifa from Samata made a similar point: 
In the past, the village mattabor or a member were responsible for giving
judgement but they would never give a fair judgment. Whoever had money
was able to ensure the verdict was in their favour. Because we try to be fair,
many people now come to us with their complaints. The matabors did not give
us much importance before. They thought we had no capacity to solve 
problems. But now their ideas about us have changed a lot.
3.4 Accountability struggles in the policy domain
Group members of all three organisations have become increasingly engaged in
the distribution of public goods and services within their community, but to a 
varying extent. Our interviews suggested that the primary form of involvement by
BRAC group members related to the distribution of Vulnerable Group
Development cards which were intended to provide destitute women with a 
‘package’ of assistance, including food transfers, training and credit. Although
most of BRAC’s groups members were not eligible for these cards, BRAC’s 
collaboration on this programme with the government and the World Food
Programme explains their high levels of involvement in the distribution process.
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NK and Samata group members, on the other hand, were engaged in monitoring
and lobbying around a wide range of social services and poverty-alleviation
schemes, including the allocation of VGD cards. While this wider degree of
engagement may reflect the difference between a women-only organisation and
organisations that worked with both women and men, it is also likely to reflect the
explicit focus on citizenship issues and the significance attached to collective
action in the philosophy and training efforts of the two organisations. Certainly
Manan (Samata) made an explicit link between his constitutional rights and group
demands for greater accountability in the public provision of social services:
As citizens of Bangladesh, we have the right to food, clothing, shelter, health
and education. It is the state’s responsibility to provide these needs … Earlier
we didn’t have proper treatment facilities in the Union clinics. We put pressure
on the UP Chairman who talked to the doctors there so that they provide 
better treatment. But we still have to ask, why do they steal and sell the 
medicines that are intended for our treatment?
Maleka Begum from NK also invoked her constitutional rights to explain the col-
lective actions taken by her group members to protest the flawed provision of
health care in her area: 
Each citizen in this society has five fundamental rights but we do not enjoy
these rights. There is no proper treatment or medicine in hospitals. We have
demonstrated in Maizdi town demanding our rights and protesting against the
corruption of doctors and theft of public medicine. So now when they hear at
the hospital that someone is from our Landless Association, they give them a
bit more respect. 
This exertion of bottom-up pressure via elected officials was one mechanism
through which landless groups were able to effect some improvements in the
delivery of social services to the poor. In addition, they had taken active part in the
various formal and informal committees responsible for the governance of 
important local institutions, including schools, markets, mosques and so on.
Zulfikar from Samata told us:
In the past we were excluded from these services but now we are getting our
due. Our members are the main source of the power that made this change
happen. We have committees in each of the nine Wards of the Union. In our
committees, we sit and discuss who is not getting proper education or 
medical treatment. As a result, people are getting some medical facilities. If
there are irregularities in providing medicines, we demand explanations from
the functionaries. Now they are afraid of us. We go to hospitals in groups and
ask why people are not getting medicine or why they do not have the 
medicine in stock. 
Akash told us that the chairmen and members used to misappropriate the wheat
allotted to the poor once they got into power. This was less possible now.
Every month I check at the Union Council about what has been allotted to the
poor. Under the VGD programme the chairman used to distribute 20kg wheat
per head instead of 30kg. When we stood together to protest this malpractice,
he was compelled to distribute the right amount of wheat. 
IDS WORKING PAPER 331
40
He was on the school committee and saw to it that teachers were taking classes
regularly. 
Other kinds of collective action in relation to social provisioning were described in
the interviews. In one area, NK group members had lobbied for the establishment
of a school for their children. In another, groups spoke of their struggle to ensure
that cyclone shelters were built in locations that were accessible to the landless. A
Samata group member told us about her group’s efforts to ensure that public
works schemes in their area filled the quota of jobs reserved for women on these
schemes. Greater awareness about gender inequality had translated into active
pressure to promote the socioeconomic rights of girls and women. As Aleya put it,
We have to establish the rights of women all over Bangladesh, not only in our
area. In our area, we talk to those families who only send their sons to school.
We ask them to send their daughters as well. We even make arrangements
for her notebooks, pen, school fee and books, which are essential to go to
school. Before the teachers were not taking classes regularly; but now we
monitor and take information about their attendance, regularities and class
performances. 
3.5 Providing leadership to poor people
A number of the rural respondents believed that proven willingness and capacity
of their groups in representing the interests of poor people in informal justice 
procedures and in the distribution of social services has meant that group 
membership has provided a seedbed for alternative forms of leadership in the
countryside. According to Akash, participation in various village committees was a
training ground in leadership for their members:
We all want that the landless people get more exposure, serve outside so that
they can get valuable experience and with that experience they make more
poor peoples aware. When a poor person gets experience, he himself is
learning new things and in turn, is also imparting this learning to the others.
That’s why we elect new leaders every year by rotation. 
Manjura believed that their role in dispute resolution had contributed to their 
emergence as leaders: 
Combining everything we do, we have become a powerful group, parallel to
the mattabars. This was not so in the beginning. But now the poor know we
stand for the law and we try to be fair. As a result the powerful people of the
society are forced to listen to us. All of this could become possible through
our membership of NGOs. 
This leadership role was evident in the fact that group members were often 
consulted for their advice and opinions on various matters by other villagers. In
the past, such consultations would have been directed to the village elite. 
This leadership role has taken on an increasingly political form with the holding of
local elections with the restoration of democracy in 1991. Local elections are held,
in principle along non-partisan lines to positions in local government at the union
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level. While seats had been reserved for women in local government, changes in
the late 1990s allowed election to these seats rather than nomination by the ruling
party. The years of activism have made NGO group members credible candidates
in these elections. A number of those we interviewed had stood for elections with
the support of their organisational networks and some had won. 
Mossamet Fatema, a BRAC member who had won a reserved seat at the local
election, explained her success in terms of the support provided by her group
members: 
We have been able to make people realise that we are on the side of 
fairness. I became a candidate after holding discussions with the group 
members. My group members went to the village with me to campaign for
vote. Previously, due to lack of awareness, people did not understand the
problems much and also could not differentiate between which judgements
were fair and which unfair. Now they have more clear ideas and for that, they
do not want to go to the corrupted member or chairman for justice.
For many of the landless groups, political participation reinforced their capacity to
ensure greater responsiveness on the part of government to the needs and rights
of the poor. Jobeda pointed to the benefits of having a NK group member elected
to the union council: 
If someone from the Bhumiheen Samity becomes a member, we come to
know about what the government is providing for the poor. Previously these
were embezzled by members and chairmen. We have now elected Jamila in
two consecutive elections. Through her we have come to know how many
VGD cards, tubewells, corrugated iron sheets and so on have been allocated
to our village. We did not distribute all of these but we distribute many. We will
achieve the rest gradually. It is not possible to climb up the top of the tree at
once. 
Kashem, who had not himself been elected, but was active in local committees,
believed that holding elected positions within local government allowed landless
group members to ensure its accountability to the poor: 
I am now in a school and madrasah committee. I make sure the teachers take
their classes properly. The Chairman and Members of the village consult us
before they distribute government assistance. However, we do not enjoy all
our rights yet. We are unlikely to do so because we have not reached that
level yet. We have elected the UP member from our landless group and the
Chairman cooperates with us. Now we are preparing to put forward someone
from our group to stand as Chairman. We have to win power if we want our
full rights. You can only enjoy very limited rights if you do not hold power. 
However, for some of the women in our sample, election to local government
brought them into new terrains of struggle as they faced the deep-seated 
prejudices against women in what had hitherto been a male domain. According to
Habiba who had been elected to one of the reserved seats in the Union Parishad:
‘Women in the UP council are treated as inferior because they are women.
Neither the chairman nor the other male members give us any responsibilities’.
Her response to this treatment was testimony to the experience she had gained
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through her membership of Nijera Kori. She collected the relevant policy 
documents from upazilla headquarters so that her group could learn about the
roles and responsibilities of the chairman and different members. They found out
that the chairman of the committee for the VGD scheme and elderly pension
allowances had to be a female member. She then called a meeting of 33 elected
women from 11 unions in the ward at which they agreed that they would withhold
their signatures from all documents until they were allowed to fulfil their 
responsibilities. They decided to try and win the support of the male elected 
members while she also talked to other women. In the end, the chairman had to
concede responsibility for the relevant schemes to the elected women. 
Jomila from NK also had to deal with the entrenched prejudices of elected 
officials, but was less successful in gaining a voice within the union parishad. The
male members did not give the women a chance to talk and the other two women
in the council kept silent most of the time. She found being the lone female voice
difficult but continued to express her views. She failed in her attempt to ensure
that women officials were given their due responsibilities, including the distribution
of VGD cards. However, she was re-elected and promised to fight on. She
believed that her honesty in government had led to her re-election:
I was a Member for the landless for five years and I have been elected again,
yet I do not have my own homestead or my own land. I do not want to build
my house by stealing from the poor.
3.6 On becoming a citizen: insights from the rural context
As we noted earlier, analysis of the experiences of members of groups organised
by socially-oriented NGOs provides us with some insights into the processes 
generated by purposively designed efforts to promote the identity and practice of
citizenship. We are now in a position to summarise some key elements of these
processes. There is no necessary sequence to these elements, they operate 
iteratively and interactively. However, an increase in awareness was the starting
point for change in most cases. We noted the emphasis placed by some of our
urban respondents on the need for greater awareness if the poor were to protest
against injustice. This emphasis resonates with the significance given to 
consciousness in definitions of citizenship in the wider academic literature. What
emerged from our rural interviews was the extent to which such awareness could
be built up over time through organisational efforts at training and discussion. 
Jobeda, who had first learnt to identify the letters of her name after she joined NK
24 years ago, told us that their previous ignorance had made the poor silent,
afraid and acquiescent: 
We had no knowledge then. Whatever the village elders said we used to take
as the truth. We never protested even though there was a lot of injustice and 
oppression in the locality. We were afraid of the chairmen, village leaders and
members. Moreover, we could not see any reason to protest. After all they
were our village leaders, we used to honor them. We thought that to argue
with the chairmen was to commit an offence. We do not think that anymore.
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Nurul Islam spoke of the diminution of fear that came with greater awareness: 
The greatest achievement from our connection with this organisation is
awareness. Before we were scared to even talk to a guard. Now we know the
reasons of our fears and so we can talk to them. Even without having formal
education, through participating in NK programmes and activities, I have been
able to become fully conscious human being. 
Shanti believed that she had learnt more from being a member of BRAC that she
had from her formal education: 
Although I have an HSC pass, I learnt more from the training I received here
than from my studies. If there had been no BRAC, I would not have learnt
about the usefulness of different plants. I have learnt that a tree is the dearest
friend of a human being. The education I got earlier told me that my only duty
was to serve my husband after my marriage. But a woman has so much she
can do besides serving her husband. A woman can work as hard as a male.
Training often helped to make unexpected connections between abstract rights
and every day life. For instance, Arif commented on how NK training had altered
his way of thinking about the family diet: 
NK created a learning environment for us. We learnt about our constitutional
rights. Till then, we had eaten simply to survive, our forefathers had also
eaten simply to survive. But when we learnt that we had a right to food, we
became interested in knowing more. We began to think about the matter 
differently. We learnt that you need a balanced diet to lead a healthy life. In
everyday meal there should be protein, vitamin and fat. That means we need
fish, meat, egg, vegetable, pulse etc. But when we ate before, we tended to
only have the same items.
Changes in awareness did not take the form of a one-off shift in thinking but of an
ongoing process of learning, reflection, action, experience, observation and analy-
sis that raised theoretical and practical questions about aspects of inequality that
had hitherto been taken for granted. They contributed to a second element in the
processes of becoming a citizen: building ‘voice’, the capacity to question, dissent,
persuade, influence and challenge. Some of the women in our sample spoke of
voice in terms of their increased role in household decision making while some of
the men acknowledged greater willingness to listen to their wives. However, it was
the capacity to exercise collective voice in the public domain that featured most
frequently as the hallmark of citizenship. According to Mussamat Nurban from
BRAC, this was the essence of citizenship: 
I am certainly a citizen of this country. Protesting against child marriage, 
making sure VGD cards are properly distributed, protesting against violence
against women – these are my rights. I have a right to speak out if anybody is
involved in corruption.
For members of Samata and NK, their collective engagements with the structures
of power in the local community ensured that their voices were heard by those
with power: 
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We are now able to talk directly to the SP or DC. We organise processions,
meetings, gheraos to claim our rights and against briber and corruption. When
necessary, we submit memorandums. I am an ordinary mechanic but now I
stand on the stage and give a speech in defense of our rights. We are now
able to go to the clinics and talk about our health care. We do not allow areas
clinics to steal our medicines and sell them in the market. Everyone talks to
each member of the landless association with respect.
(Kalam, Nijera Kori)
Earlier we didn’t know what the TNO was, now we are in discussion with that
very TNO and with the AC (land). When there is injustice, we protest, we
gherao, we bring out processions. Earlier we did not have any opportunity to
see their faces. Now we sit beside them in the chair. We talk to the chairmen
and not just the chairman. We can now face up to the upazilla administration,
the TNO, police station and others … In the hospitals, there is still no proper
treatment or medicine but if they hear that someone is from the landless
association, they try to give extra respect. Because we also made procession
in Maizdi town in defence of our rights. We have demonstrated against the
demand for bribes among doctors and theft of medicines.
(Jobeda, Samata)
Everyone in the society has equal rights. Before, we had no say in the local
shalish [alternative village court system]. We had no right to speak about what
was fair or unfair. Apart from that we were not allowed to be part of the 
committees, for school, madrasa, graveyard and so on. But now we have
established our rights. Nowadays, we are the ones who organise the village
court or shalish. In different committees, landless people are now also 
included. When we came to understand about all our rights, we learnt to
speak out for them as well.
(Korban Sheik, Samata)
This ability to exercise collective voice and agency was premised on the 
development of a collective identity, a third element in the processes of change
reported by our respondents. Economic incentives, the promise of credit or access
to land, may have motivated many to join NGO-initiated groups but it was sharing
life experiences and seeking solutions to common problems that held them
together over time. As Mossamet put it: 
Being BRAC members, the people of the group have developed strong, 
intimate relationships. They knew each other before, but the closeness was
not like this. Now, if any member is in trouble, we try to help them. If one 
person has financial trouble, we all pool donations and try to help her. If 
anyone tries to harm one of the group members then our whole group would
protest against this unfair situation. All of these became possible because we
became organised.
An NK member described a similar process:
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The people in our Bhumiheen Samity knew each other before we became a
group, but our relationship to each other has changed through our association
with each other. We didn’t use to share each others problems before. Now we
have got united, each one’s problem affects the others. We have to take care
of each other.
The regular face-to-face interactions between group members over a sustained
period of time played a critical role in the consolidation of this collective identity:
as one Samata member put it, ‘Regular meetings keep the samity alive. If we met
every two months, our samity would lose its vitality’. Meetings were held at group,
village and federation levels for a variety of different purposes: savings and credit
activities, training, discussion, conflict resolution, decisions about collective action.
Regularity of meetings served to build up predictable routines for dealing with 
disputes and addressing problems and built the confidence of members in each
other. Alam described Samata’s approach to disputes between group members
In case of any problem, we find solution in the group meetings. At first, the
members try to find out a solution. When it is not possible, the solution is
found through the Village Development Committees. If that is not possible, we
go to the Union or even further to the Regional Committee.
A similar process took place in BRAC:
We sit in monthly meeting regularly. Women together place their demands. It
is possible to establish the demands when all are united. We ourselves
decide the agenda of the meeting. BRAC representative attends the meeting.
Everybody is informed about the agenda of the meeting. Things which we
don’t understand are explained by the BRAC worker.
The relationship between group solidarity and collective action was an interactive
one: group solidarity provided the willingness and courage to act, on behalf of self
and others, while collective action helped to build and strengthen group solidarity.
The importance of ‘unity’ was a common thread running through many of the inter-
views. One Samata member said: 
One stick can be broken, a bundle of sticks cannot. It is not possible to
achieve anything on one’s own. You have no value on your own. Now if I am
ill, my samity members will look after me. Moreover to establish your rights
you need to struggle, you need to be united. If I want to stand in an election, I
would need support for that, to vote for me, to run my campaign. Can I make
myself valuable on my own? I cannot. No matter how big you think yourself,
you have to win support.
Shanti from BRAC believed that the poor gained strength through solidarity: 
What is a burden for one is a light weight for ten people. It is not possible to
do any work alone. You have no value alone. Who will look after me if I am
ill? Now there is my samity, they will look after me, will help me. Moreover, in
order to establish your rights, to do struggle you need to be together. If want
to stand in election I would need manpower for that. They will seek vote for
me, run publicity for me. Can I make myself valuable by myself? I cannot. It
will be of no use if you think yourself big. You have to win everybody’s love’.
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And an NK member said: 
The members of the landless organisation have gained courage. We hope
that by going on with the struggle, we will be able to change this society. This
would not be possible without an organisation for the landless. The way we
are able to speak out is our strength. The main source of this strength is that
10 to 20 of us got united and 10 or 20 more … I hope this unity will continue
for a long time.
A fourth important element in the organisational strategies of all three groups was
the significance attached to issues of justice and legality. A concern with legal and
constitutional rights was interwoven into the training provided by all three 
organisations. The significance attached to the law was understandable. In a
country where elites have been able to use a variety of ideologies to justify their
privilege, where governance failures impact on the poor in a myriad different
ways, the legal system, for all its imperfections, provides the only discourse within
the country which holds out the promise of equality and due process to all 
citizens, men and women, rich and poor. And while the legal system has often
been used against the poor, one of the major contributions these organisations
made in strengthening respect for the law was to demonstrate that it could also be
used to defend the interests of the poor. 
Finding out that they had legal entitlements to the khas land in their areas, and
that landlords were occupying them illegitimately, constituted an important political
moment in the process by which landless groups shifted from unquestioning
acceptance of the privileges of the powerful to a recognition of their own status as
citizens and a willingness to act collectively to enforce their legal rights. The
importance given to legality as a source of validation for their struggles was
echoed in the frequent references made by group members to what might be
called the ‘procedures and paraphernalia’ of citizenship: agendas and records of
meetings, presentations of memos, filing of petitions, measurement and 
documentation to back claims, knowing the procedures for claiming entitlements
and consulting policy documents, visits to various government offices, sitting in
chairs alongside important officials and speaking on public platforms. While these
might be regarded as mundane or bureaucratic by those who take their citizenship
rights for granted, they constituted important building blocks in the construction
and visibility of a citizenship identity among the disenfranchised. 
A fifth significant aspect of pathways to citizenship associated with group 
membership was the increasing willingness and capacity to provide grassroots
leadership. The collective actions undertaken by group members were motivated,
in the first instance, by the interests of group members but over time, groups
began to mobilise on behalf of others within the community. BRAC members
emphasised that their involvement in the distribution of VGD cards was largely on
behalf of those who were eligible for these cards, very few of whom belonged to
BRAC groups. They spoke also of their role in dispute resolution and taking up
cases of gender injustices within the wider community. Both NK and Samata
groups also took collective action on behalf of their own membership as well as
others outside it. Their collective actions included direct confrontations with 
landlords and police, strikes and collective bargaining, labour boycotts, 
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demonstrations, petitions, campaigns, press conferences and other uses of the
media. Organisational emphasis on regular savings by group members, to be 
controlled and decided on by them, was a critical resource in tiding members
through these struggles since they often entailed legal costs as well as 
interruption to their livelihood strategies. Collective savings underpinned the
capacity to take the risks associated with collective action.
The capacity to win gains by NGO groups played an important catalytic role in
developing this leadership role as well as helping groups to sustain and expand
their membership. By standing up to those accustomed to getting their own way,
and often prevailing over them, landless groups demonstrated their capacity to act
as a countervailing power to established hierarchies and drew others to their
cause. Habiba from NK emphasised the strategic importance of such gains for the
poor, however small in scale, for the credibility of organisations that claimed to
represent their interests:
In a village where women rarely left the premises of their homes, such 
victories can play an important role. They show what is possible through the
awareness, unity and organisation of oppressed women … Before women
became organised, they could not make out the difference between what was
just and what was unjust. But through our discussions in NK we were able to
understand. People have come to appreciate what we do and we are invited
to participate in shalish and dispute resolutions. Now the supreme authority of
the mattabar and chairman has been reduced. Their partial judgements have
always frustrated the poor so now they come to us for justice. And often our
organisation takes the initiative to mobilise opinion and protest on behalf of
people’s rights.
Abdur told us that he had joined Samata in 1984 when he observed how their
groups dealt with a local chairman who had tried to sell 18 trees from land 
belonging to one of the poor families in the locality. The group had called in the
amin to measure the land and thereby establish that the chairman, a powerful
local figure, was breaking the law. Matin had joined NK because he saw how their
groups were able to articulate the demands of the landless: 
I saw that those who had never spoken before were now giving speeches in
meetings, processions and conferences. Before we only saw ministers and
MPs standing on the stage and delivering speeches, now a landless person is
standing in their place and giving a speech. 
With the restoration of democracy, NGO groups had moved from putting external
pressure on the state to a more direct engagement from within. Their sustained
history of collective action on issues that mattered to the poor stood them in good
stead in local elections: many stood for local elections, a number of them won and
some were re-elected. This provided first-hand evidence to the group members,
and to the community at large, that it was possible to mobilise the poor behind
candidates either drawn from their own ranks or selected for their pro-poor 
sympathies. In contrast to the cynicism expressed by many of the working poor in
urban areas, rural group members regarded elections as an exercise in 
democracy. As Akkash from Samata said: 
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The vote is a priceless commodity. It is a kind of power. It is through our vote
that a person gets elected and commands respect in society. Our votes help
to make leaders.
For Korban Ali (Samata), the vote provided a route to power for the landless: 
I am a citizen of Bangladesh. Food, clothing, education, health care – these
are our rights … To achieve these rights, poor people will have to take power.
At present in this area, the members and chairman of the union parishad
have been elected on behalf of the landless people. Most of the members of
my union are the members of our landless association. Therefore even if the
Chairman is not a landless person, these members can create pressure on
our behalf so we can claim our rights. It is not possible to get into power in
one go. We have to work for it slowly. We have elected our members, next we
will elect chairman from our groups and then afterwards we will be standing in
elections for the MP election too.
A final important dimension in the processes of becoming a citizen related to the
sense expressed by many of our rural respondents of a transition from 
‘communities of fate’, in which life chances were determined at birth, to 
‘communities of practice’ which are evolving out of their shared learning and 
experiences and which have opened up their future to new possibilities. Our rural
respondents spoke of many of the same barriers to citizenship that had featured
in our urban narratives: the corruption of government officials, exploitation by the
rich and the insecurities of the poor. What was different – and significant – about
them were that these barriers were spoken of in the past tense. Rural narratives
of citizenship were thus largely narratives of change. The nature of this change
was exemplified by the account provided by Abdur Rahman. His father had been
one of those who the cleared char land only to lose it to a landlord. He described
the circumscribed nature of his father’s life, the life he had believed he too would
lead: ‘I never knew the tehsil office before; I barely knew how to talk with other
people. I used to see my father chopping woods in other people’s houses, but that
was as far as he could go’. Now, as a member of Samata, he had learnt to protest
and to defend his rights, he knew the various government offices and those who
held office in them, he participated in different committees of the union council.
And while the rich people he encountered continued to look down on him, ‘such
an uncouth person, nobody even knows who his father is and he wants to sit with
us’, they could no longer express their contempt aloud. 
Ibrahim from NK had also believed that his life would mirror that of his forefathers,
that the system of domination and subordination would continue to reproduce
itself endlessly into the future. His membership of Nijera Kori had opened up a 
different future defined by new possibilities: 
If we are to talk about the main strength of NK, I would say that in the past,
we the poor did not realise many things. My father was a sharecropper, I also
became a sharecropper. We thought that we would have to pass our days
doing the same things that our forefathers did, that those with assets would
stay rich and those without would stay poor. Through NK we came to know
that we are not born poor, that the government holds wealth on behalf of the
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people, that our fundamental rights as citizens of Bangladesh are written into
the constitution. Before when I needed help, I went to the mattabar. Now I go
to my organisation.
4 Visions of the just society: 
the ‘capacity to aspire’ in the 
absence of good governance
Our analysis of the narratives of the working poor bears out our expectation that
their experience of citizenship would be shaped in important ways by the 
possibilities for associational affiliation and collective action available to them. It
also bears out our expectation that these possibilities would vary considerably
between urban and rural contexts. As we have suggested, the greater ability of
socially-oriented organisations to flourish in rural areas was itself symptomatic of
underlying differences in state-society relations in the two contexts. Before we
consider the implications of our findings for the competing depictions of
Bangladesh society outlined in the earlier section of the paper, it is worth 
reflecting on the extent to which the ‘capacity to aspire’ might be influenced by
these variations in the experience of citizenship. We explored this through a
series of questions which asked our respondents their views about different 
models of social justice. The questions, which drew on the ILO (2004), were: 
l a society in which people were free to earn as much as they were able to 
l a society where everyone earned the same amount
l a society in which people were free to earn as much as they were able to but 
with an upper limit on earnings. 
l a society in which people were free to earn to the extent of their ability but 
with a minimum floor to earnings
l a society in which people were free to earn to the extent of their ability with 
government assistance for the poor.
No attempt was made to enforce a uniform interpretation of these questions. They
were used instead as means of stimulating discussion and reflection. This open-
ended approach allowed our respondents to articulate their own visions of the just
society in ways that reflected their understanding and experiences of injustice.
Many opted for more than one model, ranking them in order of preferences of
combining them as different aspects of their vision. 
What emerges from this discussion is a remarkable similarity in the visions of 
justice expressed by our respondents. There were, of course, variations in their
interpretations of their vision and in the sense of grievance, despair or hope that
motivated their preferences, but by and large, most respondents gravitated
towards similar views of justice for similar reasons. The ‘maximum ceiling’ model
of justice received the least support of the five alternatives presented, possibly
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because it was most difficult to grasp in practical terms. The option of allowing
people the freedom to earn as much as they were able was recognised to give
rise to inequalities but also considered fair by many in that it rewarded people for
differences in efforts or competence, a merit-based model of justice. Government
assistance to the poor received remarkably little support as a first preference,
although it often featured as a second, perhaps because the preferred option was
seen as out of reach. The reasons why government assistance to the poor did not
receive a great deal of support as a first preference varied. Some believed that
the sheer numbers of poor people in the country meant that government 
assistance could not constitute a sustainable solution to the problem of poverty.
Some believed that people would be ‘ruined’ by long term reliance on government
relief: that work was preferable to welfare. A third reason was the lack of faith that
the government could be trusted to help the poor, given that its functionaries were
engaged at every level in the relentless extraction of rents of various kinds.
Consequently, it was the idea of a minimum income floor and an egalitarian 
distribution of income that received the greatest support from our respondents for
reasons that are discussed in greater detail below. 
4.1 Visions of a just society: dignity and basic security
The preference for a model of justice based on the idea of a minimum floor
strongly reflected the insecurity which characterised lives and livelihoods of the
workers in our sample and the value they attached to security of basic needs. A
system which guaranteed that everyone could earn at least some minimum level
of income was seen by many as fundamental to their sense of dignity and self
respect because it would allow them to meet their own basic needs rather than
having to rely on uncertain handouts from government and the equally unreliable
benevolence of the rich. Some used the language of minimum wages to describe
this principle while others expressed it in terms of the right to work. 
The retrenched jute mill workers were the most emphatic in their support for the
idea of the right to work. Their responses expressed the strong sense of 
entitlement of a previously privileged group of workers combined with anger at the
unfair and abrupt withdrawal of these entitlements. According to Giyas: 
Every citizen has certain rights from the state. The first and foremost duty of
the state is to ensure the basic rights of its citizens in all spheres of life. Such
security can be guaranteed through a stable flow of income but the state has
taken away my job and exposed me to insecurity from all sides. The future of
my children is now uncertain. Without an income the citizen can have no
rights.
Altaf also prioritised the right to work: 
We have rights from the state, we are its citizens. Food, shelter, education,
health care, these are fundamental rights. And then there are the right to 
freedom of movement, to freedom of speech. But all these rights of mine were
lost with the closure of the mills … My first and foremost right from the 
government is the right to a proper job … If I had work, I would not have any
grievance against anyone. I need work to mitigate the hunger in my stomach
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… If I could earn, then I would meet all my other needs, such as educating
my children, food, housing and so on. 
His support for other models of justice were also interwoven with his despair at his
situation: 
I want a society where everyone will help each other. If the government or the
rich would assist the poor with money, then our situation would never be like
this. One person has crores of taka. If he can give another poor person a sum
of 20,000 taka, then that person can manage his career … there is a need for
such a society where there would be scopes for everyone to earn their 
minimum wages. I am jobless now. If I had alternative arrangements to get
work, then I would not have had so much frustration piled up inside me.
Other categories of workers also gave support to the idea of a minimum floor but
interpreted it somewhat differently. For the garment workers, it was equated with
the idea of a minimum wage. This was Jhorna’s (female) preferred model: 
I hope for a society where there will be system for everyone to earn minimum
wages. If there was a system for me to earn some money everyday, then I
would not have to depend on anyone … If the meritorious people earn more, I
would have no objection. But there should be a system for the poor to earn
their minimum wages. 
The idea of a minimum wage was also supported by Rafiq (male garment worker): 
I want a society where there will be a system for the poor and the labourers to
work for a minimum wage. People with education have more knowledge than
me, I do not object if they earn more than me. But it is necessary to have a
system that allows the poor to earn a minimum wage so they do not starve.
Support for some version of a minimum floor had been strongly reinforced among
many self-employed urban slum-dwellers by the government’s decision to ban
rickshaws from certain streets of the city. It appeared to them that not only had the
state failed to provide for the working poor in any way but it was actively attacking
their efforts to provide for themselves in the interests of the car-owning minority.
For Jahanara, the right to work was the basis on which she could achieve her
other rights:
My first and foremost right is the right to work. Yet the state does not provide
it, and when I manage to arrange my own work, it tries to stop my earnings.
When the government banned rickshaws, it did not simply ban my source of
income, it also stopped my other rights such as education, heath and shelter.
Similarly, for Salma, the ban of rickshaws, the right to work and her children’s right
to education were closely tied:
If I could earn just 100 takas a day, I would not have to depend on anyone …
The right to food is a fundamental right but the state has taken away our
source of income … the people in the slums will have to starve. I hate rich
people … It was for them that the rickshaw got banned in Dhaka city. They
said the rickshaws created jams on the roads and they could not get to school
or office on time. But we have no cars. Do our children not also need to go to
school?
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For Shathi, who had been forced to give up her garment factory job by her 
husband, the right to work had a special meaning for women:
Since my husband did not like my working in the garments, I was more or
less compelled to give up my job… I believe that I have a right to work … but
my husband will not listen to that … I want a society where there will be a
system for every one to earn minimum wages. If I have means to earn a little
bit everyday then I could have solved my own problem by myself. And I would
not have any complaints against any one. 
For Rizia Khatun, the right to work was quite simply about self-respect: 
We need a society where there will be jobs for the poor. No one wants to beg,
everyone has pride and self-respect. I have nothing. If I had a job, I would not
have to beg.
Rural workers related the right to work or the right to a fair wage to the question of
social justice, probably because of their affiliation with socially-oriented NGOs. For
Mossamet Momena (female, Samata), a just society provided employment to all at
fair wages: 
I want a society where people have the guarantee of a minimum income. No
one wants to remain unemployed. There must be jobs and people must get
fair wage. A worker has a right to a fair wage. The country needs to provide a
sufficient number of jobs for all. Secondly there is no way that one person
should earn 50,000 taka and another earn nothing. That is not right. We need
to reduce such high incomes and increase the income of the poor … The rich
can spend 50 takas in one day just to buy fish for one meal while we do not
earn 50 takas for the whole day. This is not just.
Ibrahim (male NK) said: 
What we need for all our people is the guarantee of work, adequate food and
a more egalitarian society. At present, some people cannot manage a day’s
meal despite working hard all day while others spend their days in comfort
and luxury without working at all. 
For Akash Ali (male, Samata), land provided the possibility of a minimum floor: 
Land is of vital importance to the poor. Being poor we don’t have any skills,
we do not always get work as daily labourers. We do not have any work 
during the rainy season. One day without work means starvation for us. If we
had a little land, then we could manage to meet our subsistence needs by
cultivating it as well as working as daily labourer. If we could store rice at
home, then we wouldn’t have to borrow from loan sharks. For these reasons
we have been fighting for our right to khas land. 
A somewhat different perspective was provided by Habiba (female, NK) who saw
the right to work as the basis for the voice and agency of the poor: 
One thing is clear: the rich are united in their ability to exploit but the poor are
not united in their ability to resist exploitation. This is because they are 
financially weak. So we need to a society in which there will be scope for
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some minimum level of earning. When only one person in the family has a
job, then the family is bound to become a puppet of the rich. But if all were
earning, then this would not happen. Secondly, there is a need for a society
without discrimination between rich and poor. Everyone will get equal 
opportunities. The most urgent need of the present time is to have an aware
society. Without education, it is not possible to have a conscious society. 
4.2 Visions of a just society: security of shelter and the right to
‘place’
Support for the idea of a minimum income floor, whether interpreted as the right to
work or as a minimum wage, represented support for the idea of meeting basic
needs with dignity and self respect. Although it was not explicitly factored into our
models of the just society, the right to shelter was emphatically singled out by a
number of workers as a fundamental expression of citizenship as they understood
it. The strongest articulation of this right came from those members of our sample
who had been forced to migrate into the city in search of work, who lived in
makeshift shelters and who faced the constant threat of homelessness because of
extortion by landlords and local gangs, inclement weather, accidental and 
deliberate fires but above all, because of the periodic efforts by successive
regimes to evict them from land they were deemed to have occupied illegally. 
It is not surprising therefore that the right to shelter played such an important role
in their discussions about citizenship rights and the just society. In some cases, it
was invoked as a constitutional right. In others, the significance attached to 
shelter expressed a more informal understanding of citizenship. Along with the
various material meanings attached to shelter (a roof over their heads, protection
from the elements, a basis for livelihoods), it represented a fixed point in lives
characterised by uncertainty and flux, a recognised ‘place’ in society. The 
significance of the idea of place in the context of Bangladesh is evident in the
responses to questions about identity: the majority of workers in both urban and
rural areas expressed their identity primarily in terms of the place where they were
born, their desh. For those who had been forced to leave their desh behind, the
absence of security of shelter, of a permanent address, signified the absence of a
secure identity and therefore secure relationships in society. 
As Razia Khaun put it, 
In Dhaka city we have no land or home … Poor people like us also need an
address. Every one has to have an address, but we don’t. Our relatives 
cannot find us without an address, no one can find us … The slum evictions
take away even our place to sleep. I have nothing left, what kind of identity
can I have?
According to Rafiq, a garment worker,
I have no place to sleep in Dhaka – I share the rent to a room with another
person because it is so expensive. Yet to have somewhere to live and sleep,
that too is a kind of right. Where is that right?
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Rasheda was most explicit in making the link between shelter and citizenship,
arguing that denial of security of shelter was an abrogation of a fundamental
human right: 
More than seven thousand people live in this slum. If the government evicts
us, it will turn us into homeless people. If we claim to be civilised people with
a constitution, and if everyone has a fundamental right to decent accomm-
odation, how can the government evict so many people without making alter-
native arrangements? I have one son. After much hardship I am sending him
for SSC. He received Grade A in his final examination. If this slum is
destroyed, his education is destroyed as well. I have come to the end of my
tether. I have no address of my own. If I cannot give an address, even to my
children, how can I be a citizen of this country. The question of rights and 
citizenship is irrelevant in a country which cannot even give me assurance of
accommodation.
In the rural context, it was land, rather than housing, that signified security of
‘place’. For Hashem (male, Nijera Kori): 
Land is our birthright. All governments are obliged to provide land to their
people. Among the five fundamental rights, there is also the right to 
accommodation. If I had land, I could build my home on it. I could meet my
other fundamental rights by cultivating land.
Aleya Khatun (female, Samata) saw the security of land rights as bound up with
security of place and security of identity: 
If our samity did not exist, we would be driven away from here. We would get
no justice. We would have no place in this country. Land is wealth; it lets me
send my children to school. It is my right. It is my identity. I am not a nomad.
There is a union council, as a citizen of this country, I have to pay the 
chaukidar tax of the union parishad. But to pay such a tax, I need at least
some land or a house to live in. This is the right of a citizen.
Mossamet Shanur (female, Nijera Kori) made a similar point: 
My first right from society and state is a place to live in. If I have a permanent
and safe place to stay then I would be able to manage our food myself. But
the society doesn’t want to give me this simple right to a safe place to live.
We are people uprooted by river erosion. Everything that we owned had 
perished in the river. We are citizens of this country. The only thing that the
landless believe in is that they should not be afraid of anybody except God.
The place where I live is a very beautiful and holy one. None of us will give
away our rights on this land. This char is my only family.
For Chobura (female, Samata) land represented a permanent address as well as
protection from domestic violence: 
I am a citizen of this country … if I do not have any land, any permanent
address, how can I claim to be a citizen? We need land to live. As long as my
feet are on the ground, I will feel strong. And when women have property,
their husbands cannot torture them. Nor can family or society neglect her.
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4.3 Visions of a just society: equality as shared humanity and 
realisation of potential
A third set of interpretations of the just society was sparked by the idea of an 
egalitarian distribution of income. In general, equality was interpreted in broader
terms than income, encompassing the way in which society should be organised
and opportunities distributed. However, there were variations in the articulation of
this broader vision and in the rationales offered for it. A number of people invoked
the idea of shared humanity as the rationale for a fairer world. This was the 
rationale put forward by Amerunessa (female, urban self-employed): 
I want a society where there will be no discrimination between rich and poor.
Everyone will be equal. We are all human beings, we have the same blood
flowing through our bodies, we were created by the same god and when we
die, we all go the same way. No one can take anything with them when they
die.
A similar argument about shared humanity was made by Jahanara (female, urban
self-employed): 
I want a system in the country where there will be no discrimination among
people. Everybody would live at the same level and enjoy equal opportunities.
If birds and animals can live in a similar way to each other, why can’t human
beings. After all they have more brains than animals. So why at the end of the
day is there food for one person and no food for another? 
Anwara (female, urban Proshika) described her aversion to the consequences of
inequality: 
I do not like the idea of letting people earn whatever they can and whichever
way they find. In this kind of society people do not help each other. Nor do I
support a society where people are allowed to earn as they can and where at
the same time the government supports the poor because the government
doesn’t help the poor. We starved during the flood of 1987 without 
government’s help.I like the idea of everybody earning the same. Doesn’t it
look bad living in the same society some of us can eat while others starve?
What kind of a society is it where some have food while others don’t?… The
society with equal income for all does not allow such situation. It is also good
to fix a lowest income because everybody has to survive. 
Rasheda (urban self employed, Nijera Kori), who had been without work for the
last six months, had prioritised the idea of a minimum wage floor. However, her
most eloquent argument was for a society based on equality of opportunity in
which everyone could realise their own potential: 
I want a society where there will be no difference between people. No one will
be overlooked. If everyone gets equal opportunity, then everyone can express
their merit. My son has intelligence but there is no scope for it to flourish. I
teach children in the slums and observe that their intelligence is no less than
others. But they will not even have the opportunity to finish primary school.
The existing system is responsible for this. That is why I want a system that
provides equal opportunities for all. 
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Manjura (female, rural, BRAC) envisioned a society which combined equality, 
government support and provision for a minimum level of earning: 
There should be a society where there is true education, there should be no
conflict or argument, no injustice imposed on the poor. There should be a 
system of earning in balance with the expenses and the possibility of making
savings. The government would financially help the country’s poor population
so that their suffering and miseries are ended. And lastly there should be a
system of minimum earning sources for the poor people.
For Fatema Akhter (female, rural, BRAC), arguments about equality extended to
equality between men and women: 
It is necessary to have a society in which what is fair and right will win.
Everybody will stand up to injustice. Everyone will get equal opportunity to
work. Women are paid less than men for the same amount of work. In a just
society there would be no discrimination. Everybody has the strength to work.
If everyone had a job and some way to earn a minimum wage, discrimination
would decrease ….
For many members of NK and Samata, the egalitarian model of society 
conformed most closely to their view of justice because it would eradicate the
inequalities of power and privilege which defined injustice in the present society: 
I dream of a society where everyone will have equality of income and 
opportunity. We see that in this society the rich can get away with anything
because they have money. So we want a society where justice is impartial.
There are so many disparities … they get richer and we remain trapped in the
same poverty. Yet the rich have the same two hands and two legs that we
have.
(Johura, female, rural, Nijera Kori)
Poor people need the same opportunities as the rich to survive in the society.
I do not get any opportunities while you will enjoy them all: that is not right.
There should be no discrimination between rich and poor, Hindu and Muslim.
My child cannot go to school, your children can. You have money, you can
spend 500 taka for your child to go to school. I cannot. There should be law in
the country so that everybody’s children can go to school.
(Afazuddin male, rural, Samata)
The whole of Bangladesh is one family. 14 crores of people live here. If your
family has two members and you are doing everything for them whereas
another family has eight members who are passing their days starving and
you do nothing for them, is that right or wrong? The sunlight is distributed
equally, air is distributed equally but when it comes to land, you say, ‘this land
belongs to some big business man of Noakhali.
(Shajahan male, rural, NK)
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5 Conclusion: constructing 
citizenship in the absence of good 
governance
We are now in a position to revisit some of the ideas about constructions of 
citizenship in challenging contexts with which we began this paper. In this 
concluding section, we summarise our main findings and consider their 
implications for these theoretical propositions. The overall hypothesis of the study
was that the organisation of poor people’s livelihoods, and the social relationships
it generated, was an important site for understanding their meanings and 
experiences of citizenship. This is borne out by our findings. First of all, it is 
evident from our interviews that livelihood activities constitute a major 
preoccupation for poor people as well a major source of injustice in their everyday
lives. It is also evident that their economic location had an important bearing on
their social relationships, including their relationships with state officials, market
actors and civil society organisations. 
Secondly, while our analysis confirms the pervasiveness of bad governance in
Bangladesh, and the central role of the state in generating and perpetuating this
state of affairs, it also suggests that the state is not a uniformly negative presence
in people’s lives, even in the lives of the working poor. Relationships with the state
varied – across failing and competitive industries, across public and private 
enterprise and across the formal and informal economy – but it was variations
across urban and rural locations that emerged as a major factor in differentiating
experiences of citizenship among our respondents. 
The state was experienced as a largely malign presence by our urban 
respondents. Many had been at the receiving end of various recent actions by the
state which had harmed the lives and livelihoods of working families in urban
areas, including the closure of the Adamjee jute mills, the ban on rickshaws and
recurring attempts to evict slum dwellers. In addition, of course, there was the
ongoing harassment by the police, a routine feature of the everyday lives of the
urban poor. These actions generated a great degree of antagonism towards the
state, and in the case of the anti-eviction struggles, direct confrontations. In 
addition, the absence of the state in critical aspects of the lives of the urban poor,
such as provision of health, education, water and sanitation, were as damaging to
their struggles for survival and voice as its malign presence in other aspects.
There was, of course, also considerable antagonism towards the wealthier 
classes for their exploitative use of the labour of poor people, for the benefits they
reaped from state actions just described and for their apparent ability to bend the
government to their will. But in a context in which disenfranchised sections of the
population confront powerful systemic barriers to the realisation of their rights,
these barriers take on an insurmountable quality when they are actively reinforced
by a hostile state. 
Rural narratives offered a very different picture. Here the actions of the local elite
featured far more frequently as the primary source of injustice in the lives of poor
people: their illegal occupations of khas lands to which poor people were entitled,
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their refusal to pay fair wages; their use of hired thugs to intimidate and silence
opposition, their domination of informal justice systems, their resort to false 
litigation to harass, arrest and jail their opponents and their ability to manipulate
court verdicts in their own favour. While the corruption of local government 
officials also featured in these rural narratives, there were also many examples of
the more positive manifestations of the state in the form of legislation recognising
the rights of the landless to khas land, various poverty reduction programmes,
political decentralisation and the opportunities it offered to organised groups of the
poor to contest elections or vote in their own candidates and the protection 
provided by the law against the depredations of the rich. 
Thirdly, there were also marked differences in the implications of participation in
civil society organisations in rural and urban contexts. At one level, this was a
reflection of the purposive selection of our samples and the decision to focus on
socially-oriented NGOs in rural areas. This rules out the possibility of any 
straightforward comparison of the implications of organisational affiliation across
the two contexts. At another level, however, differences in experiences of 
citizenship and collective action reflected real underlying differences in the two
contexts. Along with the active rural bias of government strategies for poverty
reduction, we noted other important differences in the lives and livelihoods of the
working poor in rural and urban areas: the interrupted and intermittent nature of
economic activities and the insecurity of shelter and ‘place’ which featured in the
narratives of our urban respondents compared with the greater stability of the
rural community, even for poor people, and the more established character of their
social relationships within the community. 
These differences in underlying conditions gave rise to different configurations of
civil society associations. Trade unions were more likely to be active in urban
areas but were largely confined to formal sector workers. The older trade unions
in the nationalised jute industry had a more stable membership than any of the
other civil society associations which featured in our interviews, but they were
largely extensions of political parties into the economic domain and their 
leadership represented the interests of their parties rather than their membership.
In any case, the contraction of the public sector had led to a decline in their 
membership and power. A number of newer unions had grown up in the newer
export-oriented garment industry but their capacity to organise workers was 
constantly undermined by the hostility of employers and the threat of dismissal
that hung over any employee that showed an inclination to protest. 
The civil society organisations most frequently encountered among the self-
employed men and women in our urban sample were the more minimalist 
microfinance organisations that restricted their activities to credit transactions.
They offered no further support to their clients and their clients expected little else
from them. The lack of regulation of the microfinance sector had meant that a
number of unscrupulous individuals had defrauded some of our respondents of
their savings, thereby increasing the general mistrust in which urban NGOs were
held. While we came across a number of the more socially-oriented NGOs with
less instrumental relationships with their constituencies, they were few and far
between. 
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Miniminalist microfinance organisations are also very active in the rural areas but
our rural sample was drawn from the membership of the more socially-oriented
NGOs in the country. As a result, the study has few insights to offer as to how
membership of minimalists MFOs might differentiate the attitudes and experiences
of the rural population. Bearing this in mind, it is not surprising that our rural
respondents had far more positive and engaged accounts of citizenship than our
urban sample but with important variations in the changes that they had 
experienced which we traced to variations in the strategies of the organisations
that they belonged to. 
In brief, the fact that BRAC confined its group-based activities to women, its 
commitment to individual market-based routes to economic empowerment, its 
provision of group-guaranteed loans, with the attendant need to ensure repayment
rates by members, and fluctuations in its commitment to the social change 
agenda may have both restricted the scope of the agenda around which its 
members took collective action as well as diluted some of the impact of its 
awareness training. 
Both NK and Samata, on the other hand, have remained consistently committed
to a structural analysis of poverty and to a radical agenda of social change, based
on the development of organisations of landless men and women and their 
collective action to claim their rights. The decision to forego any form of service
provision, financial or otherwise, means that affiliation to these organisations is
based on the intrinsic value that members attach to group solidarity and to the
possibility of material gains through their collective efforts to save, to bargain for
fairer returns to their labour and to mobilise around their rights and entitlements.
Our interviews suggest that NK and Samata members engaged in much higher
levels of collective action than those in BRAC: they were more likely to refer to
participation in protests, marches, petitions and so on, to participate in forums for
the informal dispensation of justice and in various committees responsible for local
level governance. 
In addition, the fact that the two organisations mobilise both women as well as
men has had a number of positive impacts. On the one hand, it has acted directly
and indirectly on men’s awareness of gender inequality. The trainings they attend
cover gender as well as class injustice. The experience of shared struggle with
women around class-based issues, such as the right to land or the behaviour of
village elites, appears to have engendered a greater respect on the part of many
men towards women in their families and a greater willingness to mobilise around
gender-based violations of women’s rights. On the other hand, it has promoted
women’s collective action around a wider range of class- and community-based
injustices rather than limiting these actions to gender issues.
Given these differences in relationships with the state and experiences of civil
society organisations, it is not surprising that meanings and expressions of 
citizenship varied considerably across our sample. The Adamjee jute mill workers,
with their long history in a nationalised industry and high levels of trade union
membership, spoke forcefully about their economic rights as workers, particularly
their right to work, and expressed their anger at failure of state responsibility in
upholding these rights. 
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Members of socially-oriented NGOs were also extremely articulate about their
rights, relating it to the need for basic socioeconomic security and social justice.
As their discussions of preferred models of justice suggests, a basic level of 
wellbeing and security was perceived as essential precondition for a life of dignity
and to build a better future for children. They had a strong sense of the state’s
responsibility for ensuring these preconditions, based on their knowledge of their
constitutional rights and their enhanced understanding of how government 
delivery systems were meant to work. In addition, they also expressed a strong
sense of the ‘horizontal’ responsibility, their obligation to stand up for the rights of
other poor and disenfranchised sections of the population. 
The rest of our respondents, garment workers who had sporadic encounters with
trade unions and self employment workers who were ‘thinly’ affiliated to minimalist
microfinance organisations, tended to frame their responses in terms of the
wrongs they suffered as human beings rather than as violations of their rights.
Their benchmark was justice rather than citizenship: how could a society in which
some people ate well and regularly and others were routinely hungry be described
as just? If all human beings had the same blood flowing through their veins and
were created in the same way, what justified the privileges of some compared to
the deprivations of others. 
In terms of the broader challenge of constructing citizenship in difficult 
circumstances, therefore, it is clear that state–society relations in Bangladesh
exemplify many of the barriers to citizenship that we outlined in our introduction.
But whether the metaphor of the prison used by Wood is a particularly appropriate
or helpful depiction of the nature of the problem is a different matter. Certainly we
found evidence of ‘prisoner-like’ behaviour among many respondents in the urban
areas: the compliance by the rank and file workers in the Adamjee jute mill 
workers with the corrupt practices of their trade union leadership, the fear of
unemployment that led garment workers to accept employers’ violation of their
labour rights; the despair expressed by many of the urban slum dwellers that they
could ever find leaders who could be trusted to represent their interests. A
recurring theme in their narratives was the unpredictability of lives subject to the
everyday arbitrary exercise of power so that buying a ticket in the queue did not
guarantee that the poor person would see the doctor ahead of the rich person
who had not bothered to buy a ticket. Yet even these groups were able to provide
eloquent articulations of their vision of a more just society, a vision that evoked
the principles of natural justice and denounced the unfairness of the society in
which they lived. 
Our rural interviews, on the other hand, offered a less prison-like picture. As we
noted, many of the barriers to citizenship described in rural narratives echoed
those we found in our urban narratives. What distinguished them was that these
barriers were spoken of in the past tense, suggesting that at some significant
level, there has been a real shift in the balance of power. The compliance of poor
women and men with the dictates of the wealthy could no longer be taken for
granted. Our rural respondents spoke of unpredictability in the more positive
sense of a future that was no longer dictated by their circumstances at birth but
defining by evolving possibilities. They saw themselves as citizens, or in transition
to citizenship. 
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It is difficult to encompass these changes within the metaphor of a prison. Prisons
describe social reality in dichotomous terms: people are either inside a prison or
outside it, prisoners or escapees. If the deep structures of society are as 
restrictive and resilient as Wood suggests, there is little prospect of escape until
the prison has been destroyed. Such a model of society fails to capture the 
gradual, diffuse and sometimes unanticipated ways in which social change can
occur and instead interprets anything but the most radical of changes as merely
shifts in the terms and conditions of imprisonment. 
The analysis of change provided by the citizenship narratives in this paper has a
greater resonance with Sobhan’s view of the relative fluidity of social relations in
Bangladesh and the possibility of mounting challenges from below. The anger with
which our respondents spoke of the injustices in their lives, their antagonism
towards privileged sections of society and their view that government acted on
behalf of the rich bear out his contention that legitimacy of social inequalities is
not widely accepted in Bangladesh. What Wood sees as the ‘innate deference’ of
subordinate groups may reflect a ‘surface compliance’, concealed dissent waiting
to for the opportunity to express itself. 
This raises questions about the kinds of associations that are likely to give voice
to this dissent and to forge the challenge from below. We have noted that there
has been a rapid proliferation of civil society organisations in Bangladesh, many of
which are geared to the needs and constraints of the poor. But it is clear that they
are not necessarily capable of challenging power relations, or are even designed
to do so. Most see themselves as enabling poor people to engage with the market
and to enhance their purchasing power. There is an implicit assumption that 
economic agency will translate into political agency, at least to the extent of 
participating in the electoral process. Yet it is clear that the political process 
operates through corrupt and clientilist structures. In the absence of a democratic
and responsive state, economic improvements in the lives of individuals are 
constantly undermined by various forms of unruly practice on the part of more
powerful sections of society. Survival and prosperity does indeed require 
conforming to the rules of the game and hence remaining imprisoned within these
rules.
It is here that organisations like BRAC, NK and Samata hold out the possibility for
real change. While these organisations have very differing approaches to service
provision, they share a belief in the transformative potential of group learning and
solidarity. They have demonstrated that it is possible to develop alternative 
models of social relationships in the countryside, replacing the vertical
patron–client relationships which bound poor women and men to the interests of
the rich and powerful with relationships based on horizontal solidarities with each
other. They have demonstrated that it is possible to transform consciousness
through collective training, analysis and reflection, replacing resignation to an
apparently unchanging and unchangeable ‘prison’ with the willingness to question
the justice of the system and to aspire to a different kind of society. And they have
demonstrated that it is possible to transform this critical consciousness and 
solidarity into the collective willingness and capacity on the part of poor and 
landless women and men to act in pursuit of their vision. 
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These changes have clearly not emerged spontaneously – they have been built
up over time through what we described as ‘purposively designed processes’ to
build the values, identities and practices of citizenship. But the organisational
commitment to these forms of change, and the hope they offer for the longer-term
democratisation of state–society relationships, is today the exception rather than
the rule in the NGO sector. Part of the explanation for why Bangladesh has 
performed so poorly on the governance front is that a key force for social change
within the country, its development NGOs, have been transformed over time from
organisations willing to challenge socioeconomic injustice into organisations 
largely committed to the values of the market place. 
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